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THE HEXAGON OF RELATIONSHIPS
JOHN J. DOYLE

THE ABSOLUTE OF EXPERIENCE IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF AUROBINDO
PAUL COLAÇO, S.J.

SOCRATES AND PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY
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THE HEXAGON OF RELATIONSHIPS

JOHN J. DOYLE

The square of opposition has for a long time helped students understand some of the formal relationships that may obtain between pairs of propositions, and it is likely to be used with beneficial results for a long time to come. For it does faithfully represent in a graphic manner the nature of these relationships. Indeed, teachers of logic could well make greater use of it than they commonly do in their discussion of composite propositions.

Nevertheless, because of certain shortcomings from which the square suffers, there seems to be need for another figure, not to supplant it, but to supplement it. The first of these shortcomings is that the square contains, as its principal elements, propositions; the relationships between the propositions are represented only by the lines connecting the corners, which stand for the related propositions. While it is altogether proper to call attention to the kinds of propositions that stand in certain relationships to each other, there seems also to be reason why we should emphasize the relationships themselves and show how they are like and how they are unlike one another.

In the second place, while contradiction, contrariety, subcontrariety, superimplication, and subimplication find appropriate places in the square, the figure fails to provide any way of symbolizing equivalence or independence. We treat of these two relationships when we teach

THE VERY REVEREND MONSIGNOR JOHN J. DOYLE is professor of philosophy and head of the department at Marian College, Indianapolis. He received his Ph.D. from the Catholic University of America.

conversion and obversion, but we do not show their connection with the other five. Thus we show that any proposition is equivalent to its obverse and that an *E* proposition or an *I* proposition is equivalent to its simple converse. We also point out that no inference may be made by simply converting an *A* or an *O* proposition, because the simple converse of either of these propositions is independent of it. Superimplication and subimplication are dealt with in discussions of conversion *per accidens* and inversion, but there is no means of showing the connection of these relationships with those represented on the square of opposition. It seems, therefore, that a figure presenting all seven of these relationships together is desirable for the purpose of integrating the several types of opposition with conversion and obversion.

For several years I have searched for a figure that would contain as its principal elements these seven relationships and that would illustrate their resemblances and their differences by means of their positions on the figure. Only recently has a figure suggested itself to me that appears to meet these requirements. Since it has been of some help to my students in comprehending these somewhat abstruse matters, I have entertained the hope that others also may profit from its use. The figure is the hexagon of relationships presented here.



It is not a regular hexagon, but is somewhat greater in its horizontal than in its vertical dimension. The middle portion is a square and the two sides are equilateral triangles; a horizontal line through the middle connects the extreme corners. On the corners of the figure and in its center are the names of the seven relationships that may obtain between pairs of propositions. Above and below each of these

names are letters symbolizing the definition of the relationship designated by the name.

These definitions are to be read in the following manner.

Equivalence. The relationship is such that if the first proposition is true, the second is true; and if the first is false, the second is false. "All men are mortal" is equivalent to "no men are immortal."

Superimplication. The relationship is such that if the first proposition is true, the second is true; and if the first is false, the second may be true or false. "All men are mortal" is a superimplicate of "some mortals are men."

Contrariety. The relationship is such that if the first proposition is true, the second is false; and if the first is false, the second may be true or false. "All men are mortal" is contrary to "no men are mortal."

Contradiction. The relationship is such that if the first proposition is true, the second is false; and if the first is false, the second is true. "All men are mortal" is contradictory to "some men are immortal."

Subcontrariety. The relationship is such that if the first proposition is true, the second may be true or false; if the first is false, the second is true. "Some men are mortal" is subcontrary to "some men are immortal."

Subimplication. The relationship is such that if the first proposition is true, the second may be true or false; if the first is false, the second is false. "Some men are mortal" is a subimplicate of "all men are mortal."

Independence. The relationship is such that if the first proposition is true, the second may be true or false; if the first is false, the second may be true or false. "All men are mortal" is independent of "all mortals are men."

It will be observed that of the letters symbolizing these definitions those that designate a positive connection, such that the truth or falsity of the first proposition requires the truth or falsity of the second, lie outside the figure; while those that designate the absence of a connection, such that the truth or falsity of the first proposition does not require the truth or falsity of the second, lie within the figure.

The following points of resemblance and difference among the relationships are graphically illustrated by the positions of their names and definitions.

a) Equivalence, independence, and contradiction, lying along the middle line of the figure, are similar to one another and unlike the other four relationships in that they have a certain symmetry, while the others are one-sided. For, in these three, both the truth and the falsity of one of a pair of propositions either allows an inference regarding the truth or falsity of the other or forbids such an inference; whereas, in the other four relationships, if the truth of one proposition allows such an inference, the falsity of that one forbids it; and if the truth of one proposition forbids an inference, the falsity allows it.

b) The positions of equivalence and contradiction at the opposite ends of the figure indicate a contrast between them, since, in the one case, both the truth and the falsity of the first proposition require like value in the second, while, in the other case, both the truth and the falsity of the first proposition require unlike value in the second. Independence, placed midway between these extremes, mediates between them logically also, since here both the truth and the falsity of the first proposition are indifferent to the truth and falsity of the second.

c) Equivalence, superimplication, and subimplication have something in common that is not shared by any of the rest. For in each of these either the truth or the falsity of the first of the pair of related propositions necessitates that the second be like it. In the case of equivalence, both the truth and the falsity of the first proposition make this requirement, whereas in superimplication only the truth, and in subimplication only the falsity, do so. Superimplication can be expressed by such a proposition as: "If 'all men are mortal' is true, then 'some mortals are men' is true." The converse of this proposition expresses subimplication, as when one should say: "If 'some men are mortal' is false, then 'all men are mortal' is false." Equivalence, however, cannot be expressed except by a conjunctive proposition consisting of two conditionals similar to those that indicate superimplication and subimplication. Such is the proposition: "If 'all men are mortal' is true, then 'no men are immortal' is true; and if 'all men are mortal' is false, then 'no men are immortal' is false." The resemblance among these three types of relationship is symbolized by their grouping at one end of the hexagon.

d) Likewise, the grouping of contradiction, contrariety, and subcontrariety on the triangle that forms the other end of the figure

shows that they resemble one another. For contradiction is a sort of combination of the other two. Propositions are said to be contrary when they are mutually exclusive but do not exclude a middle; they are said to be subcontrary when they are not mutually exclusive but do exclude a middle; they are called contradictory when they both exclude each other and exclude a middle. Perhaps the clearest way of indicating contrariety is the use of such a proposition as: "Not both 'all men are mortal' and 'no men are mortal' are true." And the alternative proposition is probably the best way of showing subcontrariety. Such would be the proposition: "Either 'some men are mortal' or 'some men are immortal' is true." But to indicate that two propositions are contradictory neither a disjunctive nor an alternative alone will suffice. Contradiction can be adequately expressed only by the conjunction of an alternative and a disjunctive, as in the proposition: "Not both 'all men are mortal' and 'some men are immortal' are true; and either 'all men are mortal' or 'some men are immortal' is true."

e) Superimplication and contrariety, placed at the upper corners of the figure, are alike in that the truth of the first proposition in each of these relationships has a bearing upon the truth or falsity of the second, while the falsity of the first gives no clue regarding the truth or falsity of the second.

f) Subimplication and subcontrariety, which occupy the lower corners, are also alike, for, while in each of these nothing known about the truth of the first of a pair of propositions tells anything about the second, the falsity of the first related proposition requires something in the second.

g) Superimplication, contrariety, subcontrariety, and subimplication, lying on the corners of the middle square of the figure, have a certain resemblance to independence, and differ from equivalence and contradiction, because in each of them either the truth or the falsity of the first related proposition gives no warrant for a conclusion regarding the second proposition. This fact is indicated by the position of one of the pairs of symbols for the definition of each of these four relationships within the figure, where all the symbols for independence lie.

THE ABSOLUTE OF EXPERIENCE IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF AUROBINDO

Paul Colaço, S.J.

We ended the last article with the question, Is Aurobindo's philosophy agnostic? The question is not unreasonable, for what has he proposed as the final term of our rational inquiry about the ultimate reality? Just "an [original] indeterminate mystery of which any knowledge, any understanding by the mind, is impossible."[1] What if it has all within it? What if it is the source of everything that is manifested in the universe? Mind, by the consideration of the finite manifestation cannot say, for example, that It [God] has power, intelligence, love, courage, and so on. Nor can it say that It has not.[2] The utmost that mind can affirm is that It is an unthinkable X that is somehow an ineffable All. If this is not agnosticism, what is?

Even thoroughgoing agnostics are not necessarily atheists. They admit a transcendental being. But they contend that human intelligence can affirm nothing about it, can know nothing about it. All of them do not go to the extent of Mansel in reducing the transcendent to a real zero in essence.[3] But they maintain that even though it is not a zero in itself, it is as good as a zero with regard to the human mind.[4] Even Spencer, who is generally regarded as an agnostic, has a description of the absolute quite similar to that of Aurobindo.

This is the third article in a series of studies on the philosophy of Sri Aurobindo Ghose. The first article appeared in Volume XXVIII, pp. 291-300; the second, in Volume XXIX, pp. 29-41.

[1]Sri Aurobindo Ghose, *The Life Divine* (Calcutta: Arya Pub. House, 1939-40), II, Part II, 25.

[2]*Ibid.*, 60-61.

[3]See Edmund T. Shanahan, "Agnosticism," *Catholic Encyclopedia*, Vol. I.

[4]Kant, for instance, in his *Critique of Pure Reason*, writes: "All our representations are no doubt referred by the understanding to some sort of object, and as phenomena are nothing but representations, the understanding refers them to a *something*, as the object of our sensuous intuition. This something being, however, the transcendental object only. This means, a something equal to *X*, of which we do not, nay, with the present constitution of our understanding, cannot know anything" (Book II, "Analytic of Principles," tr. by M. Müller [2nd ed.; New York: Macmillan Co., 1896], pp. 204-6).

This is what he says:

> By continually seeking to know and being continually thrown back with a deepened conviction of the impossibility of knowing, we may keep alive the consciousness that it is alike our highest wisdom and our highest duty to regard that through which all things exist as the Unknowable.[5]

If this is the common language of the agnostic, we may legitimately ask whether Aurobindo is not also an agnostic, at least of the Spencerian type.

Fortunately we have his own answer. In *The Riddle of the World* he draws a clear distinction between Victorian agnosticism and Vedantic agnosticism:

> Both speak of It as the Unknowable; the only difference is that the Vedantin says It is unknowable by the mind and inexpressible by speech, but still attainable by something deeper or higher than the mental perception. . . . The Victorian agnostic would, I suppose, cancel this qualification; he would pronounce for the doubtful existence and, if existent, for the absolute unknowableness, of this Unknowable.[6]

Therefore Aurobindo's unknowable is really the unknown and not absolutely unknowable. In fact, he tells us so in as many words:

> When we speak of It as unknowable, we mean really that It escapes the grasp of our thought and speech, instruments which proceed always by the sense of difference and express by the way of definition; but if not knowable by thought, It is attainable by a supreme effort of consciousness.[7]

And again, "The Unknown is not the Unknowable; It need not remain the unknown for us unless we choose ignorance or persist in our first limitations";[8] "It is not altogether and in every way unknowable."[9]

HOW THE UNKNOWABLE BECOMES KNOWN

What, then, is this new way of knowing the Unknowable? Aurobindo tells us that it is intuition, which is "an organization of conscious-

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[5] *First Principles* (5th ed.; New York: A. L. Burt, 1880), p. 113.
[6] *The Riddle of the World* (1st ed.; Calcutta: Arya Pub. House, 1933), p. 23.
[7] *Life Divine*, I, 18.
[8] *Ibid.*, 19.
[9] *Ibid.*, II, Part II, 42.

ness which rises high above the psychological stratum to which we give the name of mentality.''[10]

To grasp the full import of intuition as postulated by Aurobindo, we must bear in mind two of his fundamental ideas. The first is that the knowledge proper to God is entirely ''in other fashion than that of our knowledge.''[11] It has nothing of mediateness in it; there is no subject-object relation in it; not even its own self is strictly an object to it—''not a separative regard upon self turning the self into object.''[12] The knowledge of the Absolute is ''an absolute self-awareness,''[13] ''essential awareness by identity,''[14] a sheer self-awareness by self-identity.

The second of his fundamental ideas is that all creation is nothing but a graded organization of divine consciousness[15] by means of self-limitation by self-involution. Nowhere in the line of involution or creative manifestation is there any gap[16] or real distinction. All is fundamentally one reality,[17] God. Reality, though, is like the waves in the sea;[18] the phenomenal fronts have various appearances.

Now, the lowest form of divine unitive consciousness, though highest in our regard, is that organization of divine consciousness which Aurobindo calls intuition. Not that all organization of consciousness below this level is not divine; but below intuition, divine consciousness is in a dormant or semidormant state in proportion to the ''ignorance'' in which it is involved. But it is there nevertheless. In the atom it is there in the form of ''an attraction and repulsion'';[19] in plants it shows itself in wonderful ''seekings and shrinkings'';[20] in animals it manifests itself in ''purposeful'' instinct.[21] But in man intuition in its proper sense with its ''projecting blade, edge or point of a far-off super-mind light''[22] has already made an aperture[23] in the body-mind of ignorance. For in man it is the *self-conscious.* This self-consciousness, this ''direct awareness of our existence,''[24] though

[10] *Ibid.*, I, 131.
[11] *Ibid.*, 232.
[12] *Ibid.*, II, Part II, 383.
[13] *Ibid.*, 525.
[14] *Ibid.*, Part I, 382.
[15] *Ibid.*, 133-34.
[16] *Ibid.*, II, Part II, 983; cf. *The Riddle of The World,* p. 6.
[17] *Life Divine,* I, 49-51.
[18] *Ibid.*, 121.
[19] *Ibid.*, 281.
[20] *Ibid.*, 132, 281.
[21] *Ibid.*, 135.
[22] *Ibid.*, II, 999.
[23] *Ibid.*, 639.
[24] *Ibid.*, II, Part I, 350.

faint and mixed up with mental coating,[25] is a beginning of a knowledge by direct awareness, knowledge by identity proper to the divine; "it is a preparation, if nothing else, of a higher divine life."[26]

It is through this opening that man must enter into communion with God, who constitutes his basic reality and is hiding behind the various sheaths or levels of consciousness. In *Thoughts and Glimpses* Aurobindo writes:

> Man is God hiding himself from Nature so that he may possess her by struggle. . . . God and Nature are like a boy and a girl at play and in love. They hide and run from each other when glimpsed, so that they may be sought after and chased and captured.[27]

This intuitive effort of man to reach up to his inner being, which is no other than God himself, is in Aurobindo's opinion the true meaning of Yoga.[28] "Yoga," he tells us,

> is union with the Divine . . . it means getting into a consciousness by which one is no longer limited by the small ego, personal mind . . . but is in union with the supreme Self or with the universal [cosmic] consciousness or with some deeper consciousness within which one is aware of one's own soul, one's inner being, and of the real truth of existence.[29]

Man, however, does not and cannot arrive at God by one precipitous leap. There are, according to Aurobindo, several intermediate planes or worlds of luminosity lying between the divine flame of light and the flickering light of reason. There are four principal ones in the ascending order of merit and intuitive power. The *higher mind* immediately above the human mind is where one obtains luminous thoughts without ratiocination.[30] The *illuminative mind*, which comes

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[25] *Ibid.*, Part II, 998.

[26] *Ibid.*, I, 5.

[27] *Ibid.*, 15.

[28] Yoga etymologically means self-restraint or self-discipline for the purpose of self-realization. Hatha Yoga insisted more on bodily austerities and Raja Yoga on mental concentration to the exclusion of works or sacrifice. Aurobindo contends that the true Vedantic notion of Yoga as found in the Gita does not exclude work or sacrifice, but insists on doing everything in a spirit of detachment and of abandonment (*bhakti*) to the transforming power (*shakti*) of God. Cf. Aurobindo, *Basis of Yoga* (1st. ed.; Calcutta: Arya Pub. House, 1936), pp. 152-53 and *Lights on Yoga* (2nd. ed.; Calcutta: Arya Pub. House, 1942), pp. 10-11.

[29] *Lights on Yoga*, p. 16.

[30] This and the following descriptions of the higher mind-worlds of illuminative and unitive consciousness are taken from *Life Divine*, II, Part II, 985-1009. They bear striking resemblances to theosophical doctrines. Cf. the excellent and well-documented book on *The Principles of Theosophy* by

next higher in rank, is where knowledge is marked by "intense lustre, a splendour and illumination of the spirit, a play of lightnings or spiritual truths . . . and a rapturous ecstasy of knowledge." The *intuitive mind,* which is just above, and contiguous with, the illuminative mind, is the proper sphere of real and pure intuitive knowledge which "grants a compactual unity with the object apprehended." It has nothing mental about it; it is "a power of consciousness nearer and more intimate to the original knowledge by identity."[31] As a "messenger from the super-conscient"[32] there is nothing of night or obscurity in it;[33] but it is a "spiritual intuition and illumination and spiritual experience."[34] Its characteristic action "is a direct awareness while intellect is an indirect action of knowledge which constructs . . . from signs and indications and gathered data."[35] In contrast with such indirectness and symbolizing of knowledge, "intuitional knowledge is conscious or effective identity between that which knows and that which is known; it is that state of common self-existence in which the knower and the known are one through knowledge."[36]

This intuition is very different from the intuition the Scholastics speak of. By intuition Aurobindo does not understand an abstractive act of the intellect by which it immediately reads into (*intus legit*) or apprehends or grasps from the concrete material reality its essence or being without its limiting and individualizing material conditions.[37] He understands by it rather a consciousness that apprehends itself and

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Theodore Mainage (tr. by Suzanne Duche and Yvonne Cooper [1st ed.; Sheed and Ward, 1927]). We read there the following statement: "Theosophy conceives of the total history of a Universe, as of a gigantic evolution divided into two phases: a phase of involution, during which the 'forms' issued from the divine life of Ishvara wrap themselves up in a veil thicker and thicker, of cosmic matter; a phase of real evolution, during which the forms shed little by little their material wrappings, beginning with the coarsest, strengthen and exteriorize their hidden and divine potentialities, until finally they unite themselves with the one principle which is the soul of the world, that is, the 'centre of consciousness'" (p. 49).

[31] *Life Divine,* II, Part II, 947.

[32] *Ibid.,* I, 104.

[33] Aurobindo, *Isha Upanishad* (2nd ed.; Calcutta: Arya Pub. House, 1924), p. 92.

[34] *The Riddle of the World,* p. 28.

[35] *Life Divine,* II, Part I, 53.

[36] *Ibid.,* I, 99.

[37] "Et ideo proprium eius [intellectus humani] est cognoscere formam in materia quidem corporali individualiter existentem non tamen prout est in tali materia. Cognoscere vero id quod est in materia individuali non prout est in tali materia, est abstrahere formam a materia individuali, quam repraesentant phantasmata" (St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae,* I. 85. 1).

the world of realities by immediate contact or touch or, to quote his words, "by an extension of psychological experience."[38]

Hence also the union between the subject knowing and the object known is not, as the Scholastics say, in the intentional or thought order. For the Scholastics, knowledge is a spiritual assimilation and identification of the mind with the object,[39] an intentional—that is, representative—becoming of the object: *fieri quodammodo aliud.*[40] But this becoming is *sui generis.* Though it brings about a union between the subject knowing and the object known more intimately even than between matter and form or body and soul,[41] it never for a moment destroys the element of "otherness" which is characteristic of our knowledge. Knowledge is not a becoming of the object in such a way as to identify the knower with the physical being of the thing known; there is no identity of the self of the mind with the self of another being,[42] a commingling of my existence with the existence of another. But it is "an intellectual possession of *otherness*";[43] "it unites in the highest degree subjective intensity and objective extension."[44]

The becoming of the intuitive knowledge of which Aurobindo speaks has nothing of "otherness" in it. In fact the reason why he depreciates rational knowledge is that it works on the basis of separativeness (otherness) and obtains a knowledge that is objective, whereas intuitional experience, according to him, brings about "a state of common self-existence in which the knower and the known are one through knowledge."[45] Being a projection of the divine self-luminosity,[46] it shares in the divine characteristic of immediacy; hence its "main character is a knowledge by the direct contact of conscious-

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[38]*Life Divine,* I, 93-94.

[39]"Quando aliquid magis intelligitur, tanto conceptio intellectualis est magis intima intelligenti, et magis unum. Nam intellectus secundum hoc quod actu intelligit, secundum hoc fit unum cum intellecto" (St. Thomas Aquinas, *op. cit.,* 27. 1 ad 2).

[40]Aristotle *De Anima* iii, 4; St. Thomas Aquinas (?), *De Natura Materiae,* c. 1.

[41]Cf. Thomas de Vio Card. Cajetan, *Comm. in I Summae Theologiae,* 14. 1; J. Gredt, O.S.B., "De unione omnium maxima," *Xenia Thomistica* (Rome: Angelicum, 1925), I.

[42]"Intellectus in actu dicitur intellectum in actu, non quod substantia intellectus sit ipsa similitudo per quam intelligit, sed quia illa similitudo est forma eius" (St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae,* I. 55. 1 ad 2; *De Ver.,* VIII. 6).

[43]Pierre Rousselot, S.J., *The Intellectualism of St. Thomas,* tr. by J. E. O'Mahony (London: Sheed and Ward, 1935), p. 24.

[44]*Ibid.,* p. 20.

[45]*Life Divine,* II, Part II, 595.

[46]*Ibid.,* I, 418.

ness."[47] "The consciousness of the subject," that is to say, "meets with the consciousness in the object, penetrates it and sees, feels or vibrates with the truth of what it contacts";[48] it is "a concrete inner contact,"[49] "an essential awareness by identity,"[50] "a contact of existence with existence."[51]

Intuition or intuitive experience as a method of religious knowledge is as old as the Vedanta. Referring to the Advaitins Professor Hiriyanna writes: "The ideal of Advaita as in the case of other Indian doctrines, we should remember, is not merely to grasp the ultimate truth intellectually, but to realise it in one's own experience."[52]

Although intuition is an orthodox and recognized method of Vedantic knowledge, the function of intuition has varied according to the view the Vedantists took of world reality. Thus, for instance, since to Sankara the world was an illusion or a dream, intuition really meant "to re-find his personality into the impersonality of the one and only self,"[53] or, to use the more expressive phrase of Father Johanns, "to see itself away into God."[54] For Ramanuja intuition means an effort on the part of the individual soul laboring under *avidya* ("ignorance") and identifying itself with its body to refer itself back completely "as a mode to its substratum."[55]

But for Aurobindo intuition is something very different from what the earlier Vedantists understood by it. Neither Sankara nor Ramanuja nor Madhva believed in spiritual evolution. For Sankara, the soul does not evolve into God; it only realizes its identity with God or rather the complete immanence of God in it by getting out of the illusion or dream state. To Ramanuja, too, self-realization is a

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[47]*Ibid.*, II, Part I, 373.

[48]*Ibid.*, II, Part II, 997. By this passage one is reminded of intuition as described by Bergson: "By *intuition* is meant the kind of *intellectual sympathy* by which one places oneself within an object in order to coincide with what is unique in it and consequently inexpressible" (*An Introduction to Metaphyics*, tr. by T. E. Hulme [New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1912], p. 6). For more telling descriptions of intuition, see Bergson's other work *La Pensée et la Mouvant* (Paris: Alcan, 1934).

[49]*Life Divine*, II, Part II, 894.

[50]*Ibid.*, Part I, 381-82.

[51]*Ibid.*, 374.

[52]"The Place of Reason in Advaita," cf. *Review of Philosophy and Religion*, XII (1943), 15.

[53]Archibald Gough, *The Philosophy of the Upanishads* (3rd ed.; London, 1903), p. 59.

[54]P. Johanns, S.J., *Introduction to Vedanta* ("Light of the East Series," No. 23; Calcutta), p. 31.

[55]Johanns, S.J., *To Christ through the Vedanta*, Part II, "Ramanuja" ("Light of the East Series," No. 7; Calcutta), pp. 27-28.

liberation from the shackles of body delusion, but the soul does not evolve into God; "it will remain a personality for ever." [56]

But for Aurobindo it is God that is evolving in the mode; not only does the mode, as for Ramanuja, realize itself as forming the body of Brahman, but it has to realize itself as forming the essence of Brahman; it has to become divine; the divine has to really evolve in it.

Hence in this theory of spiritual evolution intuition really comes to be a God manifestation in various degrees of elevation until, in a knowledge by identity, God becomes perfectly manifest or known to the creature or, to be precise, becomes known to Itself in the creature in Itself.

Now this kind of intuition, in Aurobindo's opinion, is not only necessary to know the nature of God but is within the possibilities of man. Though in his theory of evolution mind is the "final strand"[57] of the three lower principles (mind, life, and matter), it does not mark the ultimate limit of his spiritual evolution. "Mind," he tells us, "is a passage, not a culmination";[58] "the mental consciousness of man is only a progressive term in the great emergence."[59]

But intuitive mind is not the summit of superior knowledge or superconscient consciousness. At the source of intuitive mind is the *over-mind,* which is in direct touch with the God-mind or supermind. Overmental beings living in the corona of the divine sun possess "full light and Truth, an aesthesis and sensation of beauty and delight universal and multitudinous in detail."[60]

Finally, when mind consciousness reaches the level of supermind consciousness, there dawns in it a knowledge identical with the knowledge of God, "a kind of knowledge," says Aurobindo, "which is one with Identity and by which, in a sense, It [the Unknowable Absolute] can be known."[61] But this knowledge by identity is not essentially different from intuition; it is intuition in its summit. Hence it is that Aurobindo proposes the way of intuition and experience as the

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[56]George Thibaut, *Sacred Books of the East* (ed. Max Müller), XXXIV, Introduction.

[57]*Life Divine,* I, 264.

[58]*Ibid.,* 193.

[59]*Ibid.,* 319; *Evolution* (3rd ed.; Calcutta: Arya Pub. House, 1933), pp. 20-21.

[60]*Life Divine,* II, Part II, 985.

[61]*Ibid.,* I. 18. It is called by Aurobindo "knowledge by identity" in this sense that it is God himself who knows himself in the creature by the identical knowledge of self-awareness which is his own intimate nature. When God knows himself in himself, it is knowledge by self-evidence; but when he realizes the same identical knowledge in a creature of his, that knowledge is knowledge of identity.

only path that can lead to a real and infallible knowledge about the absolute, which to mental knowledge is a mystic zero or an enigma.

WHAT THE UNKNOWABLE IS IN ITSELF

We may now ask Aurobindo what God is in himself, what intuition and higher forms of knowledge teach or have taught about the intimate nature of God.

The first truth which intuition or experience teaches about God is that he is not a formless blank,[62] or a vacant[63] infinite, or even a pure self-existence,[64] but "It is a zero which is All";[65] "It bears in itself some ineffable essentiality of all that is and that can be."[66]

It is true, he tells us, that in our mental helplessness before such an absolute reality we are constrained to erect a fiction of nothingness; we conceive it as "a mystery of infinite blankness,"[67] a big zero that surpasses all understanding. But when we approach it by way of experience, he adds, we become aware that "what appears as Zero is packed with Force, teeming with power of existence, full of actual or potential contents."[68]

Thus what appeared to our mental vision as a negative absolute now appears in intuitive experience as devoid of all negativeness and as "an unimaginable positive, an absolute quintessence of all Absolutes, far beyond the determination of the intelligence."[69]

In his explanation of the nature of this quintessence of all absolutes Aurobindo does not seem very clear. He wants to introduce a real multiplicity in God and yet somehow wants to save the simplicity of God, with the result that he appears to be making an almost impossible effort to be both consistent with himself and clear in his expression.

About one thing, however, he leaves us in no doubt: he has no use for the monistic God of Sankara. Sankara, it is true, has not denied the reality of the many.[70] But he has made creatures so fully imma-

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[62] *Life Divine*, II, Part I, 99.
[63] *Ibid., Part* II, 522.
[64] *Ibid.*
[65] *Ibid.*, I, 43.
[66] *Ibid.*, II, Part II, 524.
[67] *Ibid.*, Part I, 40.
[68] *Ibid.*, 127.
[69] Aurobindo, *Essays on the Gita,* Second Series (Calcutta, Arya Pub. House), pp. 118-19.
[70] Swami Prabhavananda in his *Vedic Religion and Philosophy* (1st. ed.; Madras: Sri Ramakrishna Math, 1943) writes that "Sankara, however, nowhere asserts that the world of plurality is non-existent. . . . As he says, it is not non-existent 'like the son of a barren woman.' It is real as long as we experience it in relative consciousness; it is unreal when oblit-

nent in Brahman that the many have no reality of their own and are reduced to a mere illusion.[71] Aurobindo contends that in the guise of advaita (nonduality) Sankara was actually preaching dvaita (duality)—God and a power of illusion or maya; whereas, he adds,

> the real Monism, the true Advaita, is that which admits all things as the one Brahman and does not seek to bisect its existence into two incompatible entities, an eternal Truth and an eternal Falsehood, Brahman and not-Brahman, Self and not-self, a real Self and an unreal, yet perpetual Maya.[72]

Although Ramanuja vigorously fought against the lifeless monism of Sankara, his solution does not satisfy Aurobindo inasmuch as it gives to the many only a qualified existence, a reality on the minor key of the divine essence, thereby destroying the essential oneness of God and replacing it by "a qualified unity."[73]

Aurobindo, on the other hand, claims that knowledge such as the ancient Vedantists had, revealed a Brahman who held in his unitarian consciousness an innumerable multiplicity coexisting with himself and yet doing no violence to his essential oneness. The oneness in Brahman, according to him, is not of such a nature as to do away with the reality of the manyness in God. God is not only nirguna (without qualities); but the rishis have in higher knowledge discovered that saguna (with quality) is also his pertinent aspect.[74] Hence all things, all aspects, whatever is and can be, "have their fundamental truth in the supreme Reality."[75] Even matter[76] of inconscience,[77] which in our

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erated in the absolute consciousness" (p. 71). Cf. George G. Dandoy, S.J., *An Essay on the Doctrine of the Unreality of the World in the Advaita* (Calcutta, 1919), pp. 15-19.

[71]"Nous pouvons distinguer," writes Dr. Ledrus in a remarkably good article, "deux aspects dans l'immanentisme sankarien. Sous l'aspect négatif, il ferme adéquatement le monde sur lui-même. Sous l'aspect positif, il tend implicitement à déifier l' essence même du monde, en lui imposant les prérogatives d'un absolu. . . . En rigueur de termes, la doctrine sankarienne n'est donc ni un panthéisme, ni un athéisme, mais plutôt—s'il est permis de créer une expression exacte—un parathéisme, une replique, une contrefaçon du divin dans l'essence du monde posée en absolu" ("L'Absolu Brahmanique," *Gregorianum*, XIII [1932], 265). Cf. Gough, *op. cit.*, pp. 45-46.

[72]*Life Divine*, I, 47.

[73]*Ibid.*, 227.

[74]*Ibid.*, II, Part I, 87. Cf. Aurobindo, *Views and Reviews* (Madras: Madras Pub. House), p. 33.

[75]*Life Divine*, II, Part I, 37.

[76]*Ibid.*, II, Part II, 1058.

[77]*Ibid.* I, 37.

mind seems to be so opposed to God-nature, is not excluded from God in its truth forms.

According to Aurobindo, therefore, the correct notion of God obtained by intuition necessarily includes both the aspects of the one and the many as equally true and real and essentially predicable of God. It is in fact the core of this philosophy, his first premise. That is why time and again he insists on the fact that the one and the many are "the two terms of the eternal existence . . . the two inseparable poles of the self-unfolding of the Absolute,"[78] "fundamental aspects of the Infinite,"[79] "two sides of the One Existence."[80]

If the one is real in God and the many also are real in God, how is Aurobindo's position appreciably different from the dualistic position of Madhva? The difference would be that whereas Madhva made the term "many" subsist eternally *with* Brahman, Aurobindo makes it subsist *in* Brahman. Still, insofar as in Brahman the many could not be simply identified with the one but remained a coexistent term, there seems to be no escape from a real duality or collectivity.

Aurobindo has forestalled this difficulty. He tells us that the one-many aspect of Brahman is only "the first movement of self-realisation";[81] and if one were to stop at this stage of intuitive knowledge, one could not help realizing the unity of Brahman as "a pluralistic unity, the drawing together of similar units resulting in a collectivity or solidarity rather than in real oneness."[82]

Sankara, in his opinion, reached this level of intuitive consciousness, but "standing between the world and the eternal reality . . . did not take one step still farther,"[83] with the result that, frightened by the apparent antinomies of the one and the many, the perfect and the imperfect, the divine and the undivine, he straightway denied with an impatient heart and mind the reality of the many.

The pantheists, he adds, committed the opposite mistake of making the reality of the one coequal to, and coincident with, the reality of the many. "The Pantheistic view of the identity of the Divine and the Universe is a truth, for this that is is the Brahman; but it stops short of the whole truth when it misses and omits the supracosmic Reality."[84] And this initial mistake, he thinks, has led the pantheists to a yet more serious affirmation which is obviously false, that the

[78] *Ibid.*, 233.
[79] *Ibid.*, II, Part I, 70.
[80] *Ibid.*, 26.
[81] *Isha Upanishad*, p. 44.
[82] *Ibid.*
[83] *Life Divine*, II, Part I, 258.
[84] *Ibid.*, Part II, 559.

being is equal to becoming; that is to say, that God is a pure becoming. But this, he maintains, is impossible, for the simple reason that "becoming is inferior to the status of Being";[85] "the One is the fundamental term of existence, the Many exist by the One";[86] the one is real "with a constituent and comprehensive, the others [the many] with a derivative or dependent reality."[87] In other words, becoming is neither intelligible nor possible without the existence of a being distinct from, and prior to, becoming.

By giving to the world a derived reality Aurobindo might escape duality in the strict sense; but still, in placing a one-many God at the origin, he does not give us a unity demanded both by reason and the Vedas. To obviate this difficulty, he gives God an aspect transcendental to the one-many aspect. "Somewhere then behind them [the two opposing terms] there must be a still greater Transcendence which originates them or upholds them both in its supreme Eternity";[88] and therefore "all views of existence that stop short of the Transcendence and ignore it," he tells us, "must be incomplete accounts of the truth of being."[89]

But the moment the intuitive mind touches the luminous transcendency of the divine, then, Aurobindo believes, the mind sees as if by a direct vision that Brahman is so much an integrality, a concordant totality, a harmonious unity, that even to speak of him as having two sides or two faces would appear inaccurate. For "they are too much one there to be differentiated."[90] Brahman in his transcendental aspect is apprehended by an intuitive mind as that which resolves all contradictions and remotest antinomies into "a perfect harmony and unison."[91] The many will not appear there with lines of demarcation. They will appear rather "plastic, interfused, each a boundless finite; for all is in each and each is in all radically and integrally."[92] Not only will there be a complete fusion between the one and the many, but the intuitive soul will realize the immanence of God in the many so thoroughly that it will see not only all in each and each in all, but also "all in God and God in all";[93] it will see that "the infinity of the multiplicity . . . is contained and possessed in the infinity of the

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[85] *Ibid.*, I, 229.
[86] *Ibid.*, II, Part I, 97.
[87] *Isha Upanishad*, p. 29.
[88] *Life Divine*, II, Part I, 25.
[89] *Ibid.*, Part II, 559.
[90] *Ibid.*, Part I, 280.
[91] *Ibid.*, I, 51; II, Part I, 277.
[92] *Ibid.*, I, 39.
[93] *Ibid.*, 118.

One . . . also the infinity of the One pours itself out and possesses itself in the infinity of the Many.''[94]

How is this possible? How is it that the one and the many aspects which refused to fuse into an essential unity before, now do so in the transcendental aspect of God? Aurobindo's answer is that in the becoming aspect of the being the many stand out as phenomenon or substance of form[95] and therefore have a certain resistance in themselves. On the transcendental level of God, on the other hand, all is plastic because the many exist there without form or substance, but ''in essence without reference to time or form or relation.''[96] They are there as mere ''self-expressions''[97] as ''eternally unrealised potentiality.''[98]

Does he then mean that the many are in the transcendental God as mere possibles; that is to say, mere finite imitabilities of the infinite perfection of God, enjoying no actuality of any kind themslves? In other words, does Aurobindo regard the powers and potentialities and so on of which he speaks as just terms of divine consciousness having only an intelligible or thought reality, or does he admit some kind of intrinsic reality in the forms themselves? The latter seems to be his view. For although in some places he speaks of many in the transcendental consciousness of the infinite as ideal formations, still he gives them something of plastic reality, though not outside divine consciousness but rather within it. For instance, in his *Ideal and Progress* he remarks:

> Certainly, ideals are not the ultimate Reality, for that is too high and vast for any ideal to envisage; they are aspects of it thrown out in the world-consciousness as a basis for the workings of the world-power. But they are primary. . . . They are nearer to the Reality and therefore always more real, forcible and complete than the facts which are their partial reflection. Reflections themselves of the Real, they are again reflected in the more concrete workings of our existence. . . . Our vulgar contrast of the ideal and the real is therefore a sensuous error, for that which we call real is only a phenomenon of force working out something that stands behind the phenomenon and that is preexistent and greater than that. The Real, the Idea, the phenomenon, this is the true order of the creative Divinity.[99]

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[94] *Ibid.*, II, Part II, 530.
[95] *Ibid.*, I, 49.
[96] *Ibid.*, II, Part I, 99.
[97] *Ibid.*, 61.
[98] *Ibid.*, 417.
[99] *Ibid.*, 2-3.

His language is clear. He tells us without any reservation that even in the transcendental God, even in spite of the fact that all is plastic and interfused there, the many are not mere ideas[100] but formulations of the being of God[101] and therefore very real [102] and "inherent within it."[103]

If, therefore, Aurobindo has stressed the transcendental oneness of Brahman, he has also taken care to make it quite clear that Brahman is not so much one as not to be "at once an essentiality, a boundless totality and a multitude."[104] It is true the multitude is not in the transcendent Brahman phenomenally—that is, in substance and form—but the many are there nevertheless as real manifestations within himself. "The individual exists in the Transcendent";[105] "it bears within itself some ineffable essentiality of all that is and all that can be."[106] The many are not lost in this aspect, even though the one is seen inherent in the many and the many in the one.

But having thus described his absolute, he fears it might be mistaken by some for a collective God. He therefore hastens to tell us that although "the Divine is always One that is Many,"[107] still "Reality is one and not a sum or concourse";[108] "the One is not plural, not a sum of things."[109]

And yet exclusion of a sum or concourse is not to be understood as exclusion of a plurality in such a way as to make the transcendent reality a monistic reality. "Plurality," Aurobindo tells us, "is not unreal";[110] "there is co-existence"[111] of the many with the one, which, even if it does not imply "juxtaposition,"[112] does not imply either commingling[113] or "mutual inclusion"[114] of the two opposites. Although all contradictions and antinomies disappear, the many do not cease to be present even in the highest aspect of the absolute, for "it is in the essentiality of its universal being a unity and a multiplicity."[115]

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[100] *Ibid.*, I, 196-97; cf. 176-77.
[101] *Ibid.*, 53-56; *Isha Upanishad*, p. 27.
[102] *Life Divine*, I, 33.
[103] *Ibid.*, II, 61.
[104] *Ibid.*, Part I, 55.
[105] *Ibid.*, 277.
[106] *Ibid.*, Part II, 524.
[107] *Lights on Yoga*, p. 31.
[108] *Life Divine*, I, 51.
[109] *Ibid.*, II, Part I, 62.
[110] *Ibid.*, 67.
[111] *Ibid.*, 66.
[112] *Ibid.*
[113] *Ibid.*, 43.
[114] *Ibid.*, 66.
[115] *Ibid.*, 456.

One fails to see how these self-contradictory statements hang together. An integral infinite simultaneously embracing[116] the one and the many and yet remaining one undivided immutable, transcendent reality, is, by all standards of logic, not only impossible but unintelligible. Aurobindo is the first to own that "all this our reason cannot grasp";[117] it is "difficult for the mental reason,"[118] even "irrational and unethical"[119] to our understanding. But his contention is that what is illogical or irrational on the mental plane need not necessarily be so on the transcendental plane of the divinity. "The normal experience of the reason is not applicable to these higher truths"[120] because it is "irrational to suppose that a finite consciousness and reason can be a measure of the infinite; this smallness cannot judge that Immensity."[121]

What then is our hope for truth and our motive for assent? Aurobindo answers,

> The intellect must consent to pass out of the bounds of a finite logic and accustom itself to the logic of the Infinite. On this condition alone, by this way of seeing and thinking it ceases to be paradoxical or futile to speak of the Ineffable.[122]

What if a one-many absolute should offer to logical analysis "abundance of difficulties"[123] or appear as incredible magic? Aurobindo's brief answer is, "What is magic to our finite reason is the logic of the Infinite."[124] The infinite has other mathematics than ours. In "the mathematics of the Infinite"[125] subtraction does not subtract and addition does not add. Hence Aurobindo assures us that, even though to our logic something might appear as self-opposing and contradictory, if it is viewed in the logic and mathematics of the infinite, "there is no such opposition and the eternity of the Many and One is a thing that is perfectly natural and possible."[126]

Even with the logic of the infinite, what has Aurobindo really told us about the nature of God apprehended in intuition? He has given just this meager information, that the absolute is not a

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[116] *Ibid.*, I, 41.
[117] *Ibid.*, II, Part I, 53.
[118] *Ibid.*, 63.
[119] *Ibid.*, 54.
[120] *Ibid.*, 118.
[121] *Ibid.*, 49.
[122] *Ibid.*, 43.
[123] *Ibid.*, 47.
[124] *Ibid.*, 52.
[125] *Ibid.*, 67.
[126] *Ibid.*, 62.

negative reality; it is a sum of positivity, admitting all terms of relativity and limitedness without opposition in its vast all-embracing consciousness and being. In short, he has told us that it is a one-many absolute in its very essence.

But this information does not tell us anything about the intrinsic nature of the absolute. We do not know whether it has any essential attributes even in its transcendental oneness. The highest order of intuition has only told us that Brahman is an integrality, a harmonious unity of the one and the many, and nothing more.

To know the nature of the one in its intrinsic oneness, Aurobindo postulates a far higher knowledge, which, though not essentially different from intuition, is a knowledge identical with that of God. He calls it knowledge by identity. In this knowledge, the mind, he affirms, not only touches the reality but in a way becomes identical with it; and that is why the unknowable becomes perfectly known in this way.

It is, moreover, Aurobindo's contention that the early rishis possessed such a knowledge,[127] and the truths which they have handed down to us are the fruit of the highest knowledge. It is, he tells us, in a "spiritual consciousness, a spiritual knowledge, a knowledge by identity, [that they realized] the Reality in its fundamental aspects and its manifested powers and figures."[128]

What are these fundamental aspects of the absolute which became known to the early Vedantic rishis and which we can know by the knowledge by identity? Aurobindo tells us that "the Unknowable knowing itself as Sadchidananda is the one supreme affirmation of Vedanta."[129] In his *Ideal of the Karmayoga* he repeats, "Sadchidananda is the eternal reality of things";[130] and again in *The Mother* he writes, "The supreme is manifest in her as the everlasting Sadchidananda."[131]

Etymologically the three terms are *sat* ("existence"), *chit* ("knowledge," "awareness," "consciousness"), and *ananda* ("joy or delight of being"). They are Vedantic in origin, but not all Vedantists have understood them to qualify Brahman in the same way. In Sankara's monism they could have no place as attributes or perfections of Brahman.[132] The *apara* ("higher") Brahman being "the last residue

[127] *Ibid.*, II, Part II, 517, 595; *Isha Upanishad*, pp. 13, 71.
[128] *Life Divine*, II, Part II, 555.
[129] *Ibid.*, I, 66.
[130] *The Ideal of the Karmayogin* (4th ed.; Calcutta: Arya Pub. House, 1937), p. 100.
[131] *The Mother* (2nd ed.; Calcutta: Arya Pub. House, 1937), p. 38.
[132] Sankara makes a distinction between *apara* ("higher") Brahman and

of all abstraction,"[133] "a bloodless Absolute dark with the excess of light,"[134] it is according to him destitute of all distinctive qualities or attributes.[135] The absolute of Sankara, if it is sachchidananda at all,[136] is such substantially;[137] that is, it is "a pure consciousness [we may add pure bliss] identical with pure existence,"[138] or, as Fr. Dandoy puts it, "it is identical being, thinking and enjoying."[139]

For Ramanuja, on the other hand, *sat, chit,* and *ananda* are real attributes[140] of Brahman. His God is a god of *bhakti* ("devotion"); hence he is full of auspicious and lovable qualities. "He is not Being, Awareness and Bliss, but *has* them, they qualify Him and make Him what He is—God";[141] they constitute his very nature.[142]

Aurobindo's position with regard to sachchidananda is in a certain sense similar to that of Ramanuja. For him, too, "Reality is in its *nature* an eternal Existence, Consciousness, Delight of Existence";[143] and because that is its nature, Aurobindo adds in his *Thoughts and Glimpses* that "Consciousness of Being and Delight of Being are the first parents [of creation]. Also they are the last transcendencies."[144]

But the sachchidananda aspect of the divine, he takes care to tell

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para ("lower") Brahman associated with maya. The latter is also called Ishvara or Lord. Now this lower Brahman, which is the god of religion, has, in his opinion, sachchidananda as distinctive attributes, but not the Brahman of philosophy which is a pure existence *(sat)*. The other attributes are there "implicit by identity," as Fr. Ledrus has well expressed it. Cf. Ledrus, *op. cit., p.* 268.

[133]Gough, *op. cit.,* pp. 36-37.

[134]Radakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy,* II, 659.

[135]Shankara Bhashya, III. 3. 33 (*Sacred Books of the East,* ed. Max Müller, XXXVIII, 239); IV. 3. 14 (*ibid.,* 394-95).

[136]According to some the attributes merely indicate absence in thought of qualities opposed to them; thus Radakrishnan in his *Indian Philosophy,* II, 537, says that "It can only be negatively described as the other of its own otherness. It is *Sat* (real) meaning that is not *asat* (unreal). It is *Cit* (consciousness) meaning that it is not *acit* (unconsciousness). It is *Ananda* (bliss) meaning that is not of the nature of pain *(duhkasvarupa)*." This opinion is also shared by Chatterjee and Datta in their *Introduction to Indian Philosophy.*

[137]Thibaut, *op. cit.*

[138]Sri Ananda Acharya, *Brahmadarsanam or the Intuition of the Absolute* (Macmillan Co., 1917), p. 159.

[139]*Op. cit.,* p. 7.

[140]Ramanuja Bhashya, III. 2. 26 *(Sacred Books of the East,* ed. Max Müller, XLVIII, 618).

[141]Johanns, S. J., *Introduction to Vedanta.* p. 32.

[142]Bharatan Kumarappa, *The Hindu Conception of Deity* (1st. ed.; London: Luzac & Co., 1934), p. 190.

[143]*Life Divine,* II, Part II, 592; I, 403.

[144]*Thoughts and Glimpses* (Calcutta: Arya Pub. House, 1941).

us, is not seized directly by intellectual understanding, "but by a spiritual intuition, a spiritual experience."[145] The human mind, he admits, can by speculation argue and grasp in some very shadowy way that God is *sat, chit,* and *ananda.* But it is by intuitive experience that they are realized and experienced as forming real aspects of Brahman. But then he adds that intuitive experience only manifests the three terms as real aspects of Brahman; how they actually constitute the nature of Brahman escapes even the highest form of intuition. It is only in the knowledge by identity that the absolute becomes perfectly manifest, and then they are felt and seen as constituting the very nature of Brahman. For then one "goes back to it in a supreme identity that transcends the terms of knowledge."[146] The absolute—God—therefore, as insisted upon by Aurobindo, is in its supreme poise, "in its manifest nature sachchidananda, a trinity of absolute existence, consciousness and bliss."[147]

Aurobindo warns us, however, that, although the supreme reality is the triune principle of sachchidananda, this trinitarian self-expression does not imply any distinction or division in the absolute. In *The Life Divine* he clearly states:

> We speak of the One as sachchidananda, but in the very description we posit three entities and unite them to arrive at a trinity. We say 'Existence, Consciousness, Bliss,' and then we say 'they are one'. It is a process of the mind. But for the unitarian consciousness such a process is inadmissible. Existence is Consciousness and there can be no distinction between them, Consciousness is Bliss and there can be no distinction between them.[148]

And elsewhere, "These are three terms, but they are really One. For all pure existence is in its essence pure self-conscience and all pure self-conscience is in its essence a pure self-delight."[149]

Aurobindo does not affirm that all three perfections are equally fundamental. Although all three constitute one indivisible reality, still *sat* or existence is the fundamental aspect of Brahman. "*Sad Brahman,*" he tells us,

> Existence pure, indefinable, infinite, absolute is the last concept at which Vedantic analysis arrives in its view of the universe, the fundamental Reality which Vedantic experience discovers behind all the movement and formation which constitute the apparent Reality.[150]

But consciousness is a necessary quality of the being of the absolute.

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[145] *Life Divine,* II, Part I, 42.
[146] *Ibid.,* I, 115.
[147] *Ibid.,* II, Part I, 419.
[148] I, 190-1.
[149] *Isha Upanishad,* p. 90.
[150] *Life Divine,* I, 101.

"Existence is in its nature Consciousness";[151] "consciousness and being are not different from each other, but all being is a supreme consciousness."[152]

In all this Aurobindo has not given us any novel doctrine. All Vedantists have affirmed that Brahman is sachchidananda. Perhaps the fact on which Aurobindo has insisted more than the other Vedantists is that, although divine consciousness is "a luminosity of pure concentrated self-awareness,"[153] it is by its very nature "a self-expressive force capable of infinite variation in phenomenon and form";[154] that is to say, as D. S. Sarma points out, for Aurobindo *chit* is not mere consciousness, but conscious-force which is inherent in the eternal being; and he adds, "Force according to Aurobindo is inseparable from Being, as *Sakti* in Hindu mythology is inseparable from Siva."[155]

The characteristic of this force, which, according to Aurobindo is "inherent"[156] in the conscious reality, is freedom and not necessity. God, he tells us, cannot be "compelled by the movement,"[157] for the infinite by definition is "essentially free from all limitation."[158] The absolute cannot be bound in its nature to manifest a cosmos of relations, but neither can it be bound not to manifest any cosmos.[159] An absolute, he continues, must be in every sense absolute; it must therefore be "entirely free to include and arrange in Its own way all possible terms of Its self-expression."[160]

This free force of consciousness Aurobindo identifies with will—"Force of being in conscious action is will."[161] This will, as we see from his descriptions, is not a faculty of self-determination that follows the knowledge of an object as good or as appetible. That is impossible in a system of philosophy that replaces intelligence in God by a pure consciousness devoid of any object. Hence when Aurobindo speaks of freedom and the will of the absolute, he only means negatively that the inherent force of divine consciousness is not limited in any way or by anything either extrinsically or intrinsically.

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[151] *Ibid.*, 319.
[152] *Ibid.*, 33.
[153] *Isha Upanishad*, p. 57.
[154] *Life Divine*, II, Part I, 93.
[155] *The Renaissance of Hinduism* (Benares Hindu University, 1944), p. 326.
[156] *Life Divine*, I, 125.
[157] *Ibid.*
[158] *Ibid.*, II, Part I, 59.
[159] *Ibid.*, Part II, 524.
[160] *Ibid.*, I, 60.
[161] *Ibid.*, II, Part II, 1115.

A conscious force that is in no way limited or restrained is necessarily also a force that pours out in delight of self-formulation and self-expression. That is why, after telling us that divine existence is a free conscious force, Aurobindo goes on to add that "all pure existence is in its essence pure Self-Delight (ananda)."[162] In the same way that consciousness is necessarily force, and conscious force is a necessary concomitant of Existence, so also

> this primary, ultimate and eternal Existence as seen by the Vedantins is not merely bare existence, or a conscious existence whose consciousness is crude force or power; it is a conscious existence the very term of whose being, the very term of whose consciousness is bliss. . . . In Absolute existence there can be no suffering, no negation of delight. . . . Absoluteness of conscious existence is illimitable bliss of conscious existence; the two are only different phrases for the same thing. All illimitableness, all infinity, all absoluteness, is pure delight.[163]

These three attributes are real in the absolute. They are so real indeed that not only *is* God sachchidananda, but He *knows*[164] himself as sachchidananda. In this self-evident self-awareness, God is aware that "the Triune principle of transcendent and infinite Existence, Consciousness and Bliss . . . is the nature of divine being."[165] Although these three stand out to human intelligence and even to human experience as three aspects of the divine, to God himself and to creatures, in a knowledge by identity,

> their poise in the being as sachchidananda [is] one; for there the Force is consciousness of being working itself out without ever ceasing to be consciousness and the Consciousness is similarly luminous Force of being eternally aware of itself and of its own Delight and never ceasing to be power of utter light and self-possession.[166]

To sum up, Aurobindo tells us that the nature of God is altogether impervious to human intelligence. But by experience one can know that God is not a sum of negations but the quintessence of positiveness harmoniously embracing in himself the aspect of both the one and the many. By experience, too, one can even come in touch with the triune aspect of God: *sat, chit, ananda.* But it is only in knowledge by identity—that is, by an identical knowledge of God,—that the soul of man apprehends, feels, and enjoys God as an ineffable and rich unity of sachchidananda.

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[162] *Isha Upanishad*, p. 90.
[163] *Life Divine*, I, 138.
[164] *Ibid.*, 66.
[165] *Ibid.*, 400.
[166] *Ibid.*, 322.

SOCRATES AND PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY

Anton-Hermann Chroust

In Plato's *Apology* 19C-D we find Socrates discussing a caricature of himself. He says significantly:

> In his comedy Aristophanes[1] has introduced a person whom he calls Socrates. This man is going about claiming that he walks on air, saying a great deal of nonsense concerning matters of which I do not pretend to know much or little. Not that I wish to speak disparagingly of such things or of those who know something about such matters. . . . I have nothing to do with physical speculations. You who have heard me, . . . tell your fellow citizens whether any of you have ever heard me holding forth . . . on such matters.

This statement apparently contains Socrates's confession that he had never been a teacher of "natural philosophy" and that he knew nothing about these matters. While it is probably safe to accept the first statement,[2] the other Socratic contention, that he knew nothing about "natural philosophy," may be accepted with

ANTON-HERMANN CHROUST got his J.U.D. from the University of Erlangen, his Ph.D. from the University of Munich, and his S.J.D. from the Harvard Law School. Mr. Chroust, formerly a research fellow at Harvard Law School, is now at the University of Notre Dame, where he is a lecturer in the Mediaeval Institute and the Graduate School. He has published articles in such magazines as the Harvard Law Review, *the* Journal of Ideas, New Scholasticism, *the* Philosophical Review, Vanderbilt Law Review, *and* Mediaeval Studies.

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[1]This refers to Aristophanes *The Clouds* 225 ff.

[2]This statement is supported not only by numerous other passages in Plato's dialogues or Xenophon's writings, but also by Aristotle in his occasional remarks about Socrates. Cf. *Metaphysics* 987b1-2 and 1078b17-18, and *De partibus animalium* 642a28-31. See also Cicero *Tuscul. disp.* v. 4. 10; *Acad. post.* i. 4. 15 and ii. 39. 123; *De finibus* v. 29. 87; *De republica* i. 10; Seneca *Epistola* lxxi. 7; Sextus Empiricus *Adversus mathematicos* vii. 8 ff.; Gellius *Attic Nights* xiv. 6. 5; Diogenes Laertius ii. 21 (based on Demetrius of Byzantium).

as much reservation as the famous Socratic claim "I know only that I know nothing."[3]

From Plato's report in the *Apology* we get the impression that Socrates apparently is not personally interested in speculations dealing with the heavens and the earth. But this indifferent attitude toward "natural philosophy" in no way indicated that he viewed the theoretico-speculative sciences with disdain. On the contrary, he makes it a definite point to assure his audience that he does not, and never did, disparage the physical sciences or the theories of the "physicists." He neither shares in an indiscriminate admiration for the cosmological or cosmogeneric theories of his predecessors nor identifies himself with that general and certainly unfair aversion of the Athenian people to the physical sciences which ultimately drove Anaxagoras and Protagoras into exile.[4] Nevertheless, Plato also seems to imply that Socrates was skeptical about the practical usefulness of the purely speculative sciences, particularly as regards the moral improvement of man. This does not mean, however, that he indiscriminately rejects all and every scientist or "natural philosopher" of his day.

Let us now compare Plato's report with that of Xenophon in the *Memorabilia* i. 1, 11-16. Xenophon's statements impress us as a cautious and apologetic effort to absolve Socrates from all suspicion of impiety, blasphemy, and profanity. They are, as shall presently be shown, not an unbiased account of the historical Socrates.

> Yet no one ever saw Socrates doing, or heard him saying, anything impious or profane. For he did not dispute about the nature of things, as most other philosophers did, speculating about how that which the philosophers call "world" came into being, and by what necessary principles everything in the heavens is affected. But he endeavored to demonstrate that those who preferred such

[3]This "I know only that I know nothing," as a rule, is found in some of Plato's earliest dialogues where all attempts at reaching a satisfactory solution of the issue under discussion seem to end in failure. Cf. *Laches* 200E; *Charmides* 175A ff.; *Hippias Minor* 376C and 372B ff.; *Meno* 80B; *Apology* 21D and 23B.

[4]Anaxagoras was charged with blasphemy for having contended that the sun was merely a molten mass. Cf. Hermann Diels, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (3 vols., 4th ed.; Berlin: Weidmann, 1934-37), 46 A 1. 12 and 42 A 35. According to Diodorus xii. 39 and Plutarch *Pericles* 32, this occurred about the year 431 B.C. Anaxagoras fled to Lampsacus where he died soon afterwards. Protagoras, according to the testimony of Diogenes Laertius ix. 54, was accused of "atheism" by Pythodorus, one of the four hundred who took over the Athenian government in 411. He escaped, but drowned on his way to Sicily.

> objects of speculation are foolish. . . . He also inquired whether, when they neglected human affairs entirely and speculated on celestial matters, they believed that they were doing the right thing. He wondered, too, why it was not apparent to them that, since it was impossible for man to satisfy himself on such points, even those who pride themselves on discussing these things do not all hold the same opinion, but are disposed toward each other like madmen. For of madmen some have no fear of what is to be feared, and others fear what is not to be feared. Some think that it is permissible to say or do anything before men, while others believe that they ought to shun the company of other men. Some pay no respect to temple, altar, or anything dedicated to the gods, while others worship stones, common stock, or plain beasts. Of those who speculate on the nature of the universe, some imagine that all that exists is one, while others hold that there are worlds infinite in number. Some maintain that all things are in perpetual motion, while others insist that nothing is ever moved. Some contend that all things are generated and subject to corruption, while others declare that nothing is ever generated or corrupted. . . . He also inquired of those who study celestial things, if they imagined that, when they have discovered by what laws everything is affected, they will be able to create at their will such phenomena as the wind, the rain, or the changes of the seasons . . . or whether they . . . are satisfied with simply knowing how everything came into being. Such were the observations which he made about those who concerned themselves with this sort of speculation. But he himself occasionally would hold discourse on what concerned mankind: what was pious and what impious; what was becoming and what unbecoming; what was beautiful and what ugly; what was sanity and what insanity; what was fortitude and what cowardice . . . He also touched on other subjects which he thought conferred a patent of nobility and distinction on the possessor . . .

The main object of Xenophon here seems to consist in absolving Socrates from all suspicion of irreligiosity. To this end he makes every effort to contrast Socrates as sharply as possible with all other philosophers and Sophists, particularly with the "physicists," who had been suspected of blasphemy since the days of Anaxagoras. According to the testimony of Xenophon, Socrates never engaged in any discussion on the problem of the physical universe. Such speculations, we are told, are actually beyond the intellectual powers of man; and, hence, whatever the philosophers may say about these

matters is akin to the ravings of madmen. In addition, Xenophon continues, Socrates apparently considered it an outrage that man should meditate about problems which are actually of a sacred and secret nature. Theoretical speculation about nature is completely worthless from a practical point of view in that it does not give man actual control over nature and its forces.[5]

The ideas advanced here by Xenophon are actually those of a conservative or "fundamentalist" thinker who perceives in every original thought an overt attack upon tradition and religion. Here the reactionary Xenophon, speaking through the mouth of Socrates, derides and denounces those who, instead of engaging in practical or lucrative pursuits, seem to waste their time and efforts meditating about the heavens. In short, Xenophon characterizes Socrates as a pronouncedly antiprogressive and antiliberal propagandist. While this characterization might fit Xenophon himself—and therefore could be called an autobiographical sketch—it is definitely contradicted by other and certainly more reliable Socratic sources.

In *Memorabilia* iv. 7. 1-10, Xenophon furnishes another illustration of Socrates's alleged hostility toward the theoretical sciences and natural philosophy. This second report was probably written at a much later date than *Memorabilia* i. 1. 11-16 and is even more radical than it. After having pointed out that Socrates was concerned with assigning tasks to his disciples which were commensurate with their abilities and inclinations, Xenophon continues:

> He also taught them how far it was proper for a well educated person to be versed in any province of knowledge. For instance, he said, a man ought to study geometry until he should be capable . . . of conveying land properly by measurement or of dividing it or portioning it out for cultivation. . . . But he disapproved of pursuing the higher study of geometry. . . . For he said that he could not see of what advantage this was, although he himself was by no means unskilled in it. But he remarked that it could consume a man's life and prevent him from attaining many other and really useful branches of knowledge. He also recommended the study of astronomy to his followers, but only so far as to be able to know the hour of the night, the month, and the seasons of the year. . . . He vehemently disapproved of any attempt at advancing the study of astronomy so far as to distinguish the heavenly

[5]In his tirade against the philosophers or "Sophists" Xenophon seems to denounce the Cynics, the Hedonists, the Milesian and Eleatic "physicists," Heraclitus of Ephesus, Empedocles, and Anaxagoras.

> bodies which do not move in the same circle with the heaven . . . and to weary oneself by inquiring into their distances from the earth, the periods of their revolutions, and the causes of all these things. For he saw . . . no profit in these studies either, although he himself had pursued them. He remarked that these pursuits could occupy a man's life and prevent him from attending to many profitable tasks. He dissuaded every one from meditating about celestial matters and the manner in which the divine power contrives to manage them. Such inquiries, he maintained, were displeasing to the gods . . . who did not wish to make certain things known to man. He also observed that a man who concentrated on such things was in danger of losing his mind or senses. . . . He advised his followers to study computations, but here as elsewhere, he counselled them to avoid useless labor. But as far as it was of any practical value, he investigated everything himself and went through it with his disciples. He earnestly admonished those with whom he conversed to take care of their health . . . studying what food or drink or what exercise was most suitable for him and how he might act so as to enjoy the best of health. . . . But if any one desired to attain to what was beyond human wisdom, he advised him to study the art of divination. For he said that he who knew by what signs the gods gave indications to men in respect to human affairs would never fail in obtaining counsel from the gods.

These passages contain the pedagogical ideas or ideals of Xenophon rather than the Socratic views on the significance of the theoretical sciences.[6] This proclivity for practical and profitable pursuits, this aversion to any innovation or scientific progress in conjunction with a marked predilection for a certain religious sentimentality, is typical of Xenophon, as can easily be ascertained from the other writings of his. Hence we cannot seriously accept Xenophon's contention that Socrates, though he mastered all these sciences, was contemptuous of them. This information is strongly contradicted by the express statement in Plato's *Apology* 19C-D that Socrates, although he was not

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[6]It is quite possible that Xenophon is here under the influence of the Antisthenean-Cynic contempt for the theoretical or speculative sciences. Cf. Diogenes Laertius vi. 7 ("Virtue does not need a store of learning [*mathemata*]"), 27-28, and 103-4. See also Plato *Theaetetus* 174A and 176C, *Laws* 819D; Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* 1141b3 ff.; Seneca *Epistola* lxxxviii. 7-9 as well as the sixth, seventh, ninth, and tenth oration of Dio Chrysostom. We are justified in assuming that these passages from Plato, Aristotle, and so on, reflect the Antisthenean-Cynic aversion to purely speculative studies.

interested in the natural sciences or cosmological speculation, never spoke contemptuously about such speculation.

Memorabilia iv. 7. 1-10, in addition to containing the pedagogical ideals of Xenophon, shows all the features of Xenophon's philosophy of life, such as religious scruples against "scientism,"[7] the advice to obtain counsel from the gods by relying on signs,[8] and a general aversion to any form of knowledge beyond immediate practical and remunerative applicability. But it is also distinguished by certain details which Xenophon seems to have borrowed from some other authority. It is safe to assume that Antisthenes is probably the ultimate source of most of the statements found in *Memorabilia* iv. 7. 1-10.

The reports in Diogenes Laertius about Antisthenes and other Cynics remind us of *Memorabilia* iv. 7. 1-10. Diogenes Laertius maintains that Antisthenes and the Cynics "discarded geometry and music and all such studies. . . . When someone showed Diogenes [of Sinope] a clock, he called it a practical instrument to prevent one from being late for dinner."[9] According to Diocles, "Socrates, when asked about the usefulness of learning, allegedly quoted [the Homeric passage]: We must inquire into 'Whatever of good or ill within our halls is wrought.' And they [the Cynics] also dispensed with the ordinary subjects of instruction."[10] And of Diogenes of Sinope it is said that

> he would wonder that the grammarians should investigate the ills of Odysseus, while they were ignorant of their own ills; or that the musicians should tune the strings of the lyre, while leaving the dispositions of their own souls discordant; or that the mathematicians should gaze at the sun and the moon, but overlook matters close at hand; or that the orators should become excited over justice in their speeches, but never practice it.[11]

We are also told that Diogenes of Sinope, in this view a disciple of Antisthenes, "held that we should neglect music, geometry, astronomy, and similar studies, as useless and unnecessary."[12] But perhaps the most significant statement about Antisthenes and his views on theoretical speculation is found in Diogenes Laertius vi. 11: "He

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[7]*Memorabilia* iv. 7. 6-7.

[8]*Ibid.*, 10.

[9]Diogenes Laertius vi. 104.

[10]In Diogenes Laertius vi. 103. The quotation within the quotation is from Homer *Odyssey* iv. 392.

[11]Diogenes Laertius vi. 27.

[12]*Ibid.*, 73. Cf. Seneca *Epist.* lxxxviii. 7; Stobaeus *Florilegia* xxxiii. 14 and lxxx. 6.

maintained that virtue is an affair of deeds and does not need a store of words or learning."

These Antisthenean or Cynic ideas seem to reappear in Xenophon's *Memorabilia* iv. 7. 1-10. Hence we may suspect that Xenophon credits Socrates here with the practical *paideia* ideal of the Cynics, which, as we have seen, is definitely opposed to theoretical speculation.[13] Since the views of Antisthenes and the Cynics are not those held by Socrates, we may inquire into Socrates's true position on theoretical speculation. That Socrates was not contemptuous of the ideas and theories of the pre-Socratic philosophers, particularly those of the Milesians and Eleatics, is attested in Plato's *Apology* 19C-D. There exists no valid reason why we should doubt the testimony of Plato that Socrates "was not one who spoke disparagingly of those who were engaged in speculations about natural philosophy." Hence it can also be maintained that Socrates was not guilty of despising the theoretical sciences, as Antisthenes, the Cynics, and Xenophon suggest.[14]

Plato, Xenophon, and Aristotle seem to agree that Socrates was not inclined toward theoretical speculation by nature. We should also not overlook that the Socratic method was essentially eristic dialectics. The eristic nature of some of his discourses alone could be interpreted as a vehement and contemptuous opposition to all theoretical speculation and as an effort to belittle the ideas and hypotheses advanced by the "physicists." But Antisthenes and Xenophon draw an unwarranted inference when they declare that Socrates recognized only moral issues as the proper object of rational knowledge. Equally distorted, if not altogether erroneous, is the opinion of Antisthenes and Xenophon that Socrates despised all theoretical speculation and that he denied outright the possibility of arriving at valid theoretical truths.

Closer analysis of the reports of Antisthenes and Xenophon reveals, on Xenophon's own admission, that Socrates valued at least that type of theoretical knowledge which lends itself to immediate practical application. Hence it cannot be maintained that Socrates had nothing but disdain for any form of theoretical knowledge—the

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[13]It could be argued that the Antisthenean and Cynic rejection of all theoretical speculation actually goes back to Socrates and that hence Xenophon's report might be accurate. We shall try to show, however, that this is not so.

[14]If Socrates actually had been opposed to all theoretical speculation, we could argue here that Plato hardly would have made Socrates his spokesman in some of the most speculative dialogues.

more so as Xenophon himself concedes that Socrates was well versed in the theoretical sciences[15] when, in *Memorabilia* i. 6. 14, he reports a conversation between Socrates and Antiphon: "Also the treasures of the wise men of old, which they have left written in books, I [Socrates] turn over and peruse in the company of my friends; and if we find anything good in them, we pick it out and consider it a great gain . . ." Who are these "wise men of old" whose writings Socrates perused in the company of his friends? Perhaps *Memorabilia* iv. 2. 1 furnishes the answer to this question, where the "wise men of old" are identified as "the most celebrated poets and philosophers."[16] Hence the "wise men of old," referred to in *Memorabilia* i. 6. 14, are probably the old poets and philosophers. In any event, by combining *Memorabilia* i. 6. 14 and iv. 2. 1, we are permitted to conclude that Socrates and his friends read these writings.[17]

Memorabilia i. 6. 14 apparently not only supports Plato's contention that Socrates did not despise ancient physical or cosmological speculations, but actually refutes the statements of Xenophon in *Memorabilia* i. 1. 11-16 and iv. 7. 1-10. If we compare Plato's *Apology* 19C-D and Xenophon's *Memorabilia* i. 6. 14, we must admit that Xenophon goes even further than Plato. While Plato reports that Socrates was disinterested in theoretical speculation without, however, criticizing it, Xenophon claims that Socrates not only avidly read the works of the ancient philosophers and physicists, but that he actually discussed them with his disciples and incorporated their theories into his teachings, thus gaining valuable knowledge for himself and his pupils.[18] But the report in Xenophon contains even more startling information. We are told there that Socrates occupied himself with the writings of the pre-Socratics during the

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[15] *Memorabilia* iv. 7. 2-10.

[16] The whole passage reads as follows: "Euthydemus, surnamed the Beautiful, had collected many writings of the most celebrated poets and philosophers." Cf. *ibid.*, 2. 8. See also Diogenes Laertius ii. 22, where we are told that Euripides gave Socrates the treatise of Heraclitus.

[17] This assumption is also supported by the general context in which this passage appears. Xenophon points out that while the Sophists stressed the interpretation of the old poets, Socrates, being less one-sided, discussed the whole "wisdom of the ancients," the poets as well as the philosophers.

[18] This idea seems to be implied in the wording of *Memorabilia* i. 6. 14: "If I know anything good, I communicate it to them [his followers] . . . Also the treasures of the wise men of old . . . I peruse in the company of my friends; and if we find anything good in them, we pick it out and consider it a great gain . . ."

last period of his life, when, at least according to tradition, he had become completely absorbed in ethico-practical questions. As a matter of fact, the passage apparently implies that the lecture and discussion of the "philosophers of old" took up the greater part of Socrates's work and interest.[19]

Since the statement of Xenophon that the aging Socrates had studied the writings of the old philosophers is nearly unique in the whole of the Socratic literature, we are justified in doubting its reliability. Our doubt is confirmed by the fact that in matters of historiography and biography Xenophon is not always above suspicion. The *Memorabilia,* in particular, is frequently open to serious historical questioning. According to its author, it consists partly of accounts of Xenophon's allegedly personal experiences with Socrates and of witness reports attributed to others,[20] collated primarily for the purpose of exalting and glorifying Socrates.

From what source, then, did Xenophon derive the impression that Socrates supposedly studied and discussed "the philosophers of old"? We might suggest here the following possible sources of information. First, he was probably familiar with the Socratic tradition cultivated not only within the early Academy, but also current among other Socratics, such as the Cynics, Hedonists, the school of Megara and the school of Eretria. It is not improbable that some of these Socratics in their indiscriminate hero-worship of Socrates might have attributed to him a universal mastery of all types of knowledge. Secondly, like Aristophanes, he could have made use of some popular tradition or belief, the exact origin or nature of which can no longer be ascertained. Thirdly, he could have relied here on some *Logoi Sokratikoi,* which were highly esteemed during the early part of the fourth century. In view of the fact that the personal relationship between Socrates and Xenophon was a very casual one, we might exclude the possibility that this information was based on some personal reminiscence.

If, however, Xenophon should actually have had some definite source or sources for his contention, then we might suggest the following influences. As regards the "ancient poets," Xenophon could have relied on some of Plato's exhortations that youth should famil-

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[19]This report is the more amazing since Xenophon, in *Memorabilia* iv. 7. 6-7, has Socrates saying that "a man who was anxious of such investigations, was in danger of losing his mind."

[20]Cf. *Memorabilia* i. 3. 1 ff., 4. 2, and 6. 14; ii. 4. 1 and 7. 1; iv. 3. 2 and 8. 4; and so on.

iarize itself with some of the "proper" poets;[21] or he might allude here to the Antisthenean practice of interpreting the "old poets."[22] In the study of the "ancient philosophers," Xenophon could have been under the influence of Plato's *Sophist* 242C ff. It can be demonstrated that Xenophon was acquainted with the Platonic *Sophist*[23] and that the whole characterization of the Sophists and Sophist method in *Memorabilia* i. 6 is modeled after Plato's *Sophist* and perhaps even the *Statesman*. If it is true that *Memorabilia* i. 6—including the passage in i. 6. 14—is under the influence of the Platonic *Sophist* (and there can be little doubt that this influence actually exists), then we should have here another instance of Xenophon's appropriating the views and sayings of others without any regard for consistency and coherence. In his eagerness to collate every Socratic dictum he displays little concern over the fact that the report in *Memorabilia* i. 6. 14 contradicts *Memorabilia* i. 1. 11-16 and iv. 7. 1-10, which two passages obviously contain Xenophon's genuine beliefs about Socrates's attitude toward the speculative sciences.

There is a reasonably convincing explanation for the claim of Plato that Socrates manifested little interest in the purely speculative sciences and the natural sciences in particular; there is a like explanation for the declaration of Xenophon and Antisthenes that he even displayed a certain disdain for them. While the school of Miletus, Elea, Heraclitus of Ephesus, and the so-called early Pythagoreans on the whole had limited their inquiries to speculations and hypotheses about the *basic* metaphysical principles underlying the physical universe, the later physicists such as Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Leucippus, Diogenes of Apollonia, Cratylus, and others had tried to apply these hylozoist ideas to the concrete and individual phenomena of nature. These efforts, which often led to incredibly fantastic theories, met with little approval and even at times with ridicule. Hence it might be maintained that Socrates did not disparage the metaphysical theories and hypotheses proposed by the

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[21]Cf. *Protagoras* 326A; *Laws* 810C.

[22]Cf. Diogenes Laertius vi. 18.

[23]In *Memorabilia* iv. 5. 12 we are told that "the expression διαλέγεσθαι had its origin in the practice of the people of meeting together in order to reason on various matters, and to distinguish them according to their different kinds (διαλέγοντας κατὰ γένη τὰ πράγματα)". Cf. *ibid.*, 5. 11: ". . . to distinguish those pursuits . . . according to their several kinds (διαλέγειν κατὰ γένη) . . ." This definition of διαλέγεσθαι undoubtedly goes back to Plato *Sophist* 253D: "Should we not say that the distinction according to kinds (τὸ κατὰ γένη διαιρεῖσθαι) . . . is the business of the science of dialectics?"

more sober early physicists.[24] According to the *Apology* 19C-D, he seems to have held them in esteem, despite the fact that he did not pretend to understand or appreciate them. What Socrates apparently objected to was the direct application of these teachings to the concrete facts of experience. To him this probably seemed to be "a great deal of nonsense."[25]

Socrates's basic attitude toward theoretical knowledge is perhaps expressed in some of Plato's dialogues. Here he always seems to insist that only qualified and properly trained persons should hold offices or engage in activities demanding aptitude and expert knowledge.[26] Thus his main efforts were directed at discovering not only what kind of knowledge constituted expertness, but also whether a person was competently qualified to act as an expert. Again and again he points out that the prerequisite of true competence is expert knowledge and understanding.[27] Such a competent knowledge, we are told, must be "like proceeding from first principles."[28] But mere speculative inferences from first principles are not sufficient for truly expert knowledge, particularly if this knowledge is to be useful to mankind and promote the good of man as well as that of society. First principles, hypotheses, and the various inferences must be tested against the facts of experience.[29] The type of knowledge which Socrates seems to hold in little esteem, on the other hand, is that kind of abstract speculation which is outside the realm of empirical verification or practical applicability and hence cannot contribute much to the moral betterment of mankind.

In his negative attitude toward the theoretical speculations on "natural philosophy" of the later physicists, Socrates apparently found strong support among the so-called "empirical physicians," often referred to as the school of Cos. These empirical physicians, under the leadership of Hippocrates, held that scientific medicine must be based on experience, experiment, and observation rather than abstract theories or hypotheses about the "metaphysical" nature or

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[24]Plato seems to point out that Socrates rejected merely the excesses of the later physicists, but never the general cosmological theories of the early physicists. Cf. Plato *Phaedo* 96A ff.; *Republic* 529A; *Philebus* 23D ff.; *Laws* 966E ff.

[25]Plato *Apology* 19C.

[26]The same idea seems to be at the basis of Xenophon's *Memorabilia* iv. 7. 1-10, particularly 1.

[27]Cf. *Crito* 47AB; *Laches* 184E ff., 189E ff., 192C ff., 193B, 193C, and 195A ff.; *Protagoras* 313D ff. and 356D; *Gorgias* 500A ff.; and so on.

[28]*Laches* 189E.

[29]Cf., for instance, *ibid.*, ff.

essence of man and the universe.[30] It is quite possible that Socrates was acquainted with the scientific views propagated by the school of Cos.[31] As a matter of fact, in some of the Platonic dialogues Socrates seems to delight in using illustrations or analogies borrowed from the type of medicine which had been developed by Hippocrates and the school of Cos.[32] He refers frequently to the competent physicians—the physicians from Cos—as *technikoi,* that is, as people who have a correct and competent knowledge of their profession.[33] Only in appreciating the high significance of the term *techne* in the Socratic-Platonic nomenclature can we understand the praise which Socrates is bestowing upon the empirical physicians. Hence we could very well maintain that Socrates's passive attitude toward the dilettante later physicists and the speculative theories developed by them might be under the influence of the empirical physicians.[34] But Socrates did not completely adopt the views of these empirical physicians. His philosophical interest transcended their rather limited range of interest, although he probably agreed with some of their methods and techniques based on experiment and observation. For is not the "Socratic method" in itself an experimental method with moral man as its foremost object?

In *The Clouds* of Aristophanes[35] Socrates is portrayed as a fantastic "philosopher of nature"[36] who discusses relatively simple issues in the most abstruse manner.[37] It is safe to assume that Aristophanes takes advantage of the gossip that was common in Athens.[38] How

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[30]See Theodor Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers* (4 vols., authorized ed.; London: John Murray. 1939) I, Book III, ch. i, 275-316.

[31]Cf. H. Nohl, *Sokrates und die Ethik* (1904), pp. 33 ff.

[32]Cf., for instance, *Laches* 190A ff., 185C ff., 198D ff., and 192E ff.; *Protagoras* 313D ff., and 345A; *Crito* 47B ff.; *Charmides* 156B ff., and 170E ff. The name of Hippocrates appears in *Protagoras* 311B; *Phaedrus* 270C. Cf. also *Charmides* 156E.

[33]Cf. n. 32.

[34]The same idea seems to be contained in Xenophon's *Memorabilia* iv. 7. 9.

[35]It is commonly held that the version of *The Clouds* which has come down to us is an unfinished revision of the original work which Plato knew and rebuked in *Apology* 19B ff.

[36]*The Clouds* 225 ff. These remarks actually fit Diogenes of Apollonia. Cf. Diogenes Laertius ix. 57.

[37]This description would apply to Protagoras rather than Socrates. Cf. Aristotle *Rhetoric* 1407b6 ff.

[38]As a rule the Athenian comedians of the latter part of the fifth century chose their topic from contemporary events. They tried to amuse the audience by ridiculing personalities or incidents familiar to the audience. Hence it might be assumed that the characterization of Socrates in *The Clouds* is based on what the Athenian populace believed or gossiped about Socrates and his activities.

could such gossip arise? If we could believe the testimony of Plato's *Apology* 19C-D, Socrates would never have discussed any cosmological or physical problems, either at the time Aristophanes wrote *The Clouds* (424-423 B.C.) or during the last decade of his life.[39] Nevertheless, since there is usually some element of truth in any rumor, we must assume that the gossip about Socrates's concern with natural or cosmological speculation was based on some facts. This would induce us to concede that Socrates at one time or another did have contacts with the later physicists who resided in Athens and that he was familiar with, and perhaps even interested in, certain aspects of their teachings which he might have discussed among his disciples and followers.[40]

Plato himself lends some support to this assumption: "When I was young [said Socrates], . . . I had a prodigious desire to know that domain of philosophy which is called the investigation of nature. To know the causes of things, to know why a thing is, why it is created or corrupted, seemed to me to be a lofty profession . . ."[41] This passage would suggest that at one time the young Socrates actually had an interest in natural speculation, an interest which, according to Plato's admission, he soon lost.[42] This Platonic report also finds strong support in the testimony of Diogenes Laertius ii. 23: "Ion of Chios states that in his youth he [Socrates] visited

[39]It has already been pointed out that Xenophon's remark in *Memorabilia* i. 6. 14 is without any real significance.

[40]The meeting of "the young Socrates" with "the old Parmenides" and Zeno described in Plato's *Parmenides* is definitely fictitious and cannot be adduced as historical evidence. In Plato's *Charmides* 163D, *Cratylus* 384D, and *Hippias Maior* 282C it is claimed that he was a pupil of Prodicus. These reports are likewise not very reliable. Xenophon, always a rather untrustworthy source, claims that Socrates was familiar with geometry and astronomy (*Memorabilia* iv. 7. 2-5), and that he was acquainted with natural philosophy (*ibid.*, i. 1. 14 and iv. 7. 6). Less reliable sources insist that he was a pupil of Anaxagoras (Aristides *Oratio* xlv, Diogenes Laertius ii. 19 and 45) or of Archelaus, the disciple of Anaxagoras (Diogenes Laertius *ibid.*, 19). The remark that Socrates was acquainted with Archelaus, however, may have some merit, as we shall show presently. Cf. Theophrastus *Physic. Opin.* in H. Diels, *Doxographi Graeci* (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1929), 479. 17.

[41]*Phaedo* 96A ff. Obviously, this report contradicts Plato's statement in *Apology* 19CD that Socrates never occupied himself with natural philosophy. But it is fairly easy to explain this apparent contradiction. *Apology* 19CD suggests that as a teacher Socrates "had nothing to do with physical speculations." This does not exclude that perhaps as a young man he might have had "a prodigious desire to know that part of philosophy which is called the investigation of nature." Xenophon *Symposium* i. 1. 5, however, calls Socrates a "self-taught person" (αὐτουργὸς τῆς φιλοσοφίας).

[42]*Phaedo* 96B ff.

Samos in the company of Archelaus.''[43] Archelaus, the elder contemporary of Socrates, was a disciple of Anaxagoras.[44] There is no particular reason why we should distrust the account of Ion of Chois as related by Diogenes Laertius. We could even adduce the following general argument in support of Ion's statement. The concept of purposefulness seems to play an important role in the moral teachings of Socrates. Now the notion of purposefulness constituted one of the central ideas in the cosmological teachings of Anaxagoras, and it must be assumed that Archelaus adopted the Anaxagorean hypothesis of an all-pervading cosmic purposefulness. As a matter of fact, among the disciples of Anaxagoras Archelaus stood out by his efforts to include also the problem of men and human affairs in his cosmo-teleological theories.[45] Hence Archelaus appears to be the man who might have instigated the novel trend in the history of Greek philosophy which consisted in a marked shift from cosmological speculation to anthropological investigation. This effort of Archelaus might have left its imprint on Socrates and Socratic teaching. Because of the influence of Archelaus, Socrates, who perhaps was originally interested in issues of natural philosophy,[46] could have become concerned with anthropological questions, thus bringing ''philosophy from heaven down to earth.''[47] In the light of all these facts it could be maintained that Socrates, at least during his youth, was acquainted with the physicists and with Anaxagoras in particular.[48]

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[43]Eduard Zeller, in *Die Philosophie der Griechen* (3 vols.; Leipzig: O. R. Reisland, 1920-23), II, Part 1, 49, n. 3, doubts the truth of this report. Zeller claims that it is in conflict with Plato, *Crito* 52B, where we are told that Socrates never left Athens except to attend the Isthmian games or while serving in the Athenian army during the Peloponnesian War. Gomperz gives full credit to the report of Diogenes Laertius.

[44]The story, ascribed to Aristoxenus and related by Diogenes Laertius ii. 19 (cf. also Aristoxenus *Frag. Hist. Graec.* ii. 280), that Socrates was the "lover" of Archelaus, is definitely part of the usual *chronique scandaleuse* of Aristoxenus. Cf. Porphyry, in Theodoretus of Cyrus, *Graecorum affectionum curatio* i. 29. Cf. Diels, *Die Fragmente,* ch. xlvii; Diogenes Laertius ii. 16-17: "Archelaus was the teacher of Socrates . . . It would seem that Archelaus himself also treated of ethics, for he has discussed laws and goodness and justice. Socrates took the subject from him, and, having improved it to the utmost, was regarded as its inventor."

[46]Plato *Phaedo* 96A ff.

[47]Cicero *Tuscul. disp.* v. 4. 10; *Acad. post.* i. 4. 15.

[48]Diogenes Laertius ii. 19 contains the following report: "According to some authors he [Socrates] was a pupil of Anaxagoras . . . as Alexander states in his *Succession of Philosophers.* When Anaxagoras was condemned, he became a disciple of Archelaus, the physicist." Cf. *ibid.,* ii. 45: "Both were disciples of Anaxagoras, I mean Socrates and Euripides . . ." These reports are rather unreliable.

Anaxagoras of Clazomene had come to Athens about 461 and resided there until about 431, when he had to flee the city in order to escape persecution for blasphemy. It would be difficult to believe that during these thirty years Socrates, with his insatiable intellectual curiosity, should not have met Anaxagoras, whose reputation and personal friendship with Pericles had made him one of the most talked-of personalities in Athens. And even should we concede that the famous Anaxagoras in his aloofness and intellectual reserve might have spurned any personal contacts with the young and insignificant Socrates, it is not inconceivable that Socrates heard and perhaps even eagerly absorbed the views held by Anaxagoras, particularly the Anaxagorean doctrine that the universe was set in motion and controlled by the act of a supreme and unchangeable intellect.[49] Of all the philosophers of that time Anaxagoras must have attracted Socrates on account of his theory that the universe is a rational, beautiful, and all-purposeful order, governed by an eternal intellect.[50] In any event, definite traces of the Anaxagorean idea of a universal cosmic purposefulness can be discovered in the development and teachings of Socrates.[51] It was Anaxagoras, perhaps through the intermediary of Archelaus, who taught Socrates the teleological significance of the universe.[52] The moral teleology of Socrates might

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[49]Cf. Plato *Phaedo* 97B ff.: "Then I [Socrates] heard someone reading . . . from a book of Anaxagoras that the intellect was the disposer and cause of all, and I was delighted at this notion which appeared quite admirable. And I asked myself, If this intellect is the disposer, the intellect will dispose all for the best, and put every particular thing in the best place. And I argued, If anyone should desire to find out the cause of the generation or corruption or the existence of anything, he must find out what state of being or doing or suffering was best for that thing. Therefore a man had only to consider the best for himself and others, and then he would also know the worse, since the same science comprised both. And I rejoiced to think that I had found in Anaxagoras a teacher of the causes of existence such as I desired . . ."

[50]Frag. 12 (Diels).

[51]In a general way it might be said that Socrates primarily reflected on the meaning of the practico-ethical life and its rational understanding. He pointed out that the true significance of life consists in doing the right thing, in man's ceaseless labor for ethical improvement, and in his participation in all that is true, good, and beautiful.

[52]The beginnings of a teleological conception of nature can be detected in Plato *Laches* 189E ff.:"The other mode of carrying on the inquiry . . . will be more like proceeding from first principles. For if we knew that the addition of something would improve some other thing, and were able to make the addition, then, surely, we must know how that about which we are advising may be best and most easily attained. . . . Let me make my meaning plainer in this manner. Suppose we knew that the addition of sight makes better the eyes which possess this gift, and also

very well have been stimulated by the cosmological teleology of Anaxagoras and the cosmological and anthropological teleology of Archelaus, the disciple of Anaxagoras.

Socrates's insistence that all truly significant human activity must be based on rational understanding and expertness in itself implies a definite appreciation of the theoretical sciences and theoretical speculation. The Socratic maxim that he who knows the good also does the good presupposes a speculative determination of the good. At the same time the Socratic demand that meaningful action requires expert knowledge connotes a teleological element. For Socrates defined meaningfulness in terms of an all-pervading purposefulness within the moral universe. In their final analysis, such ideas are the result of a definite effort to arrive at the truth of human existence. They are the anthropological corollary of the pre-Socratic attempts at restating on a rational basis the significance of the whole of the physical universe. In this sense we could maintain that pre-Socratic speculation had a definite influence on Socratic thought. It was pre-Socratic philosophy which, in opposition to the traditional superstitions or mythologies, also inaugurated that type of intellectual progressiveness and independence which became the necessary foundation of Socrates's own ideas and teachings.[53]

Like the great speculative thinkers of the past, Socrates tried to speculate on the meaning of total existence. But unlike the pre-

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were able to impart sight to the eyes; then, clearly, we should know the nature of sight and should be able to advise how this gift of sight may be best and most easily attained. But if we knew neither what sight is, nor what hearing is, we should not be very good medical advisors about the eyes and the ears or the best mode of giving sight or hearing to them." Since the *Laches* is definitely a "Socratic dialogue," we are permitted to assume that the ideas expressed here are those of Socrates.

[53]A. E. Taylor, *Socrates* (London: P. Davies, 1932), pp. 62-63, insists that according to Plato *Phaedo* 96A-100A, Socrates had studied the various current cosmological theories, beginning with those advanced by Archelaus and Diogenes of Apollonia. He supposedly not only knew the biological theories of Empedocles and Alcmaeon of Crotona, but also became troubled by mathematical difficulties connected with the Eleatic concept of the One. The many contradictions between the tenets of rival theorists perturbed him considerably, until he became acquainted with Anaxagoras who, he hoped, would show him how it is best that every detail of the universe should be disposed, and how it must therefore be disposed in a universe controlled by a supreme intelligence. But Anaxagoras, too, disappointed him when it appeared that he had introduced the concept of a cosmic intellect only as a kind of "first cause" rather than as an intelligent plan permeating the universe. All these experiences, Taylor concludes, convinced Socrates that he had little aptitude for the natural sciences. Cf. Plato *Phaedo* 100D.

Socratics, Socrates was not concerned with the total significance of the physical universe. True to his anthropological interest in the study of man, he directed his investigations to the evaluation and understanding of the totality of human life and human existence.[54] Behind Socrates's anthropological concern, however, there is always a universal cosmic outlook which in its comprehensiveness reminds us of the universality inherent in the cosmological speculations of the earliest Greek philosophers. Socrates did not become interested in a theoretical or dogmatic elaboration of his cosmic outlook. He gratefully accepted whatever the philosophers of the past had said about the meaning, rationality, beauty, and purposefulness of the universe.[55] To him this was not only a sufficient, but a most acceptable background for his own moral teachings.[56]

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[54]If we can trust the testimony of Plato and Xenophon, Socrates would always have insisted on the unity of knowledge. Cf. Plato *Phaedo* 97B ff. Such a unity of knowledge, however, presupposes an understanding of the physico-cosmological and moral problems.

[55]In this connection one should read Plato *Symposium* 220C: "One morning he [Socrates] was thinking about something which he could not resolve. He would not give it up, but continued thinking from early dawn until noon. And there he stood steeped in thought. At noon attention was drawn to him, and the rumor ran through the wondering crowd that Socrates had been standing and thinking about something ever since the break of day. At last, in the evening . . . some Ionians . . . brought out their mats and slept in the open air that they might watch him and see whether he would stand all night. There he stood until the following morning, and with the return of light he offered up a prayer to the sun, and went his way." Cf. *ibid.*, 174D and 175B. See also G. Zuccante, *Socrate* (Turin, 1909), p. 377.

[56]Cf. here in particular Plato *Phaedo* 97B-99D. This passage makes it quite clear that Socrates was profoundly in agreement with the basic cosmo-teleological hypothesis of Anaxagoras, while at the same time he was disappointed in the results of a detailed theoretical application of this Anaxagorean hypothesis.

NOTES AND DISCUSSION

Fourth Annual Meeting of the Missouri Philosophical Association

The fourth annual meeting of the Missouri Philosophical Association was held at William Jewell College, Liberty, Missouri, on October 19 and 20, 1951.

The first session was devoted to three papers. Mrs. Marianne Childress of Saint Louis University, in "Current Thomistic Discussion on 'Existence,'" explained the position of several leading Thomists on the way existence is known. In "Common Sense in the Philosophy of Thomas Reid," Jean H. Faurot of Missouri Valley College gave an excellent exposition of Reid's proposed basis for realism. Especially noteworthy were the defense of Reid against the charge of irrationality and the analysis of the epistemological value of "touch." Meredith F. Eller of Central College summarized the positions of Brightman in "The Theory of a Finite-Infinite God in the Philosophy of Edgar Sheffield Brightman."

The annual dinner was followed by the presidential address, "Declaration of Independence for Philosophy," by Robert J. Henle, S.J., of Saint Louis University, and by the business meeting. Father Henle distinguished two types of knowing proper respectively to philosophy and science; on this basis he rested the internal independence of each discipline. An extended and pointed discussion followed the address.

The Saturday morning session was a symposium on the foundations of ethics. Richard S. Rudner, of Washington University, handled the topic of "Ethics Grounded in Science"; Irving Sosensky, of Missouri University, that of "Ethics Grounded in the Social Process"; and C. Eugene Conover, of Lindenwood College, that of "Ethics Grounded in Metaphysics." The general discussion was particularly penetrating and revealed important weaknesses in all three positions.

Professor Eugene Hix of Central College was elected president to succeed Father Henle. Miss Caroline G. Nations was re-elected secretary-treasurer.

The committee responsible for the excellent program of this year's meeting was composed of Guy H. Ranson, of William Jewell College, W. Donald Oliver, of Missouri University, and Huston Smith, of Washington University.

CHRONICLE

The Instituto Cultural Argentino Norteamericano of Buenos Aires presented a series of conferences during August and September, 1951, on the topic of salient aspects of North American philosophy. The conferences were under the general direction of Professor Francisco Romero, who also gave the introduction. Professor Adolfo P. Carpio spoke on the origins and development of North American philosophy; Professor Romero, on Josiah Royce and idealism; Professor Carpio, on William James and pragmatism; Professor Vicente Fatone, on Dewey and the philosophy of democracy and on Santayana and essentialist philosophy. Professor Romero, in the final conference, dealt with personalist philosophers.

BOOK REVIEWS

Endliches und ewiges Sein: Versuch eines Aufstiegs zum Sinn des Seins. By Edith Stein. Louvain: Nauwelaerts; Freiburg: Herder, 1950. Pp. xii + 497. DM 23; paper, DM 20.20.

Only now, a decade after her brutal extermination at Auschwitz, is Edith Stein coming into her own as an influential philosopher. Her career began as a student and assistant of Edmund Husserl at Freiburg in Breisgau, where she received the doctorate (with a dissertation on empathy) in 1916. Her original contributions to Husserl's *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung* showed the highest competence in the use of the phenomenological method. Psychological and social problems occupied her in these studies, published during the nineteen-twenties. The themes of her *Jahrbuch* articles are psychic causality, individual and community, the nature of the state, and, finally, a comparison between Husserl's phenomenology and the philosophy of St. Thomas (1929). This last article was a contribution to a *Festschrift* in honor of Husserl's seventieth birthday and was an indication of her growing preoccupation with Thomism.

Edith Stein entered the Catholic Church in 1922, taught for a decade at the Dominican girls' school at Speyer, and began teaching at the Pedagogical Institute in Münster on the eve of Hitler's accession to power. Because of her Jewish ancestry, she was removed from this position in 1933 and entered the Carmel at Köln-Lindenthal the following year, taking the name Sister Teresia Benedicta a Cruce. She was forced to flee to the Carmel at Echt, Holland, in 1938. She was seized by the Nazi secret police in August, 1942, shipped to Auschwitz and gassed to death. Thereafter, her influence has gradually become of international scope.

During her years as a Catholic laywoman, Edith Stein was deeply influenced by the German Jesuit philosopher Erich Przywara, whose chosen work lay mainly in the zone where traditional and modern currents of thought intermingle. He directed her study to the great line of Christian fathers, theologians, and mystics. St. Augustine, Dionysius, St. Thomas Aquinas, St. John of the Cross, and St.

Teresa of Avila engaged her main attention in the reading of Christian sources. As a preliminary exercise, she issued a two-volume translation of Aquinas's *De Veritate,* rendering his Latin into a flowing German, replete with phenomenological approximations to the technical Thomistic terms. By 1931, she had written a work (still in manuscript) entitled *Potency and Act*: *Studies toward a Philosophy of Being.* These four hundred pages give ample witness to the energy with which she pursued her studies in Aristotelian and Scholastic philosophy, as well as her concern with bringing phenomenology and Scholasticism closer together. This work also indicates her independence of St. Thomas, since on several issues she deliberately follows the contrary lead of Duns Scotus or other Schoolmen. Although she covers much the same ground as did Przywara, her approach is made from a different level. As she put the difference, Przywara attempted to follow the inner historical laws of development, whereas her phenomenological training inclined her rather to a direct rethinking of the matter in its theoretical immediacy, with history playing a minor role.

Despite the dangers attending her life after 1933, Edith Stein continued to write steadily on philosophical, religious, and mystical topics. Her manuscripts were preserved by her fellow Carmelites, who are now issuing this edition of her works in collaboration with L. Gelber, the archivist of the Husserl archives at Louvain. The first volume contained her analysis of mysticism—*The Science of the Cross*: *Studies on John of the Cross.* The third volume will reprint her translation of the *De Veritate*; the fourth (apparently) will contain briefer philosophical essays, perhaps including the *Jahrbuch* articles; the final volume will be a collection of pedagogical addresses and articles. A number of manuscripts will still remain unpublished, but are perhaps planned for future publication.

The present work—volume two in the series—incorporates the main ideas of her earlier treatise on *Potency and Act* and develops the themes at greater length. It was written during 1935 and 1936, and was already set up in type at Breslau when the order against publishing non-Aryan writings was issued by Hitler. The author characterizes it both as an essay in perennial philosophy and as an effort at *Auseinandersetzung* between Aquinas and Husserl. There is no contradiction here, since she defines perennial philosophy not in a sectarian Scholastic way, but as the persevering efforts of men throughout history to arrive at the truth of being. This meaning is the prevailing one among phenomenologists and existentialists today;

it permits discussions to begin between them and those philosophers at least who admit the importance (though not necessarily the validity) of metaphysics. The author neither pretends that a complete reconciliation is possible between Aquinas and Husserl nor commits herself to integral acceptance of the doctrine of either philosopher. But she does believe that with their aid a good deal of progress can be made toward discovering the meaning of being, both as finite and as eternal.

The basic ways of viewing being are examined. Chapters are devoted to act and potency, essential and actual being, substance and accident, form and matter, and the transcendentals and the problem of individuation. In each instance, a fairly uniform method is followed. The point of departure is made in an analysis of the texts of Aristotle and Aquinas. Further understanding of the Thomistic teaching is sought from Manser, Gredt, and Roland-Gosselin's edition of the *De Ente et Essentia.* Occasionally, other secondary works are consulted, but fine historical points are avoided. Then an independent reworking of the problem is attempted, at which juncture the phenomenological method is extensively used. The phenomenologists most frequently cited are those who gave a realistic interpretation to Husserl's doctrine and who repudiated the master's own leaning toward transcendental idealism. In natural philosophy, Hedwig Conrad-Martius is relied upon, whereas in metaphysical and psychological descriptions the lead of Alexander Pfänder and Jean Hering is followed. After criticisms of the Thomistic and phenomenological positions are offered, a common basis of agreement is sought. Maritain's solution of the problem of a Christian philosophy is accepted, thus permitting the introduction of the testimony of dogmatic and mystical theology at relevant places.

The result is a remarkably powerful synthesis between Scholasticism and phenomenology. No one who has been hopeful of such a synthesis will want to overlook this detailed proposal. It is immensely instructive, for example, to observe the author's initial treatment of act and potency both in the traditional objective way and in terms of one's own self-experience. Since the intentional or object-intending nature of our experience is a basic phenomenological thesis, Stein is able to demonstrate in practice how the facts of one's own inner life can be examined for metaphysical purposes, without prejudice to the reality of the material world. In making the transition from the self as a typical mode of finite being to the eternal being of the transcendent God, she relies heavily upon the procedures and witness of St.

Augustine. Another way in which the art of *rapprochement* is skillfully exhibited is through the approach to essence. The Scholastic distinction between essence and quiddity is exploited to prepare the ground for the manifold phenomenological distinctions between the actual essence and the pure, intended essence. The familiar contrast between real and logical being is made the springboard for a number of exhaustive analyses of the ways in which being can be actual, ideal, and merely conceived. Several sections of Scholastic metaphysics (which even the Scholastics have allowed to remain moribund) are given a suprisingly vital and pertinent treatment. This rejuvenation of old themes in the light of new interests and resources is specially apparent in the sections reserved for the transcendentals and angelology. That we cannot grasp the full sense of being, without regarding it from the standpoint of its unity, truth, goodness, and beauty, is shown in a series of masterly reflections on the significance of the transcendental aspects of being. The treatise on the angels is rescued from even greater oblivion. The author's readings in the pseudo-Areopagite provide her with a suitable introduction to the Thomistic explanation of angelic nature and operations. These latter investigations are among the minor triumphs of the book.

Edith Stein has made a highly personal evaluation of the sources that contribute to her outlook. The synthesis is between a realistic phenomenology and certain features of Scholasticism, including large portions of the Thomistic doctrine, rather than between Husserl and Aquinas in their integral minds. There are certain obstacles preventing the latter project from being carried out or even from being properly conceived in all its difficulties. For one thing, the author does not make a historical approach to the study of St. Thomas. As a consequence, she does not raise questions about the relation between Aristotle and Aquinas or between Aquinas and medieval thinkers, particularly Avicenna. This absence of awareness of certain major historical issues confronting Aquinas has made the main plan of reconciling him with phenomenology appear to be an easier task than in fact it is. The plan is further facilitated — and yet ultimately rendered doubtful — by an explicit refusal to take up the problem of knowledge and the outstanding differences which Edith Stein had already noted in her contribution to the Husserl *Festschrift*. Since these differences concern the nature and scope of the meaning of being, the present treatise does not include all the data of the discussion.

On several questions, the author announces her disagreement with Aquinas. The principle of individuation (which she sometimes con-

fuses with individuality itself) is located in the form rather than in signate matter; a spiritual matter is placed in angels, who are pure spirits but not pure forms; all creatures (and not only men) bear the image of God; universals have an irreducible nature of their own. Scotus is appealed to as a counterauthority on these issues. *Why* these somewhat peripheral criticisms of Aquinas are made and recourse had to Scotus, is explained by a fundamental disagreement that is not announced and perhaps not fully recognized as such. Finite being is ultimately defined in terms of the unfolding of meanings. This is consistent with the contention that the pure forms or meaningful essences arrived at through phenomenological analysis of empirical data are ontologically more basic than either the act of real existing or the conceptions of our mind. The broad term *Existenz* is used to embrace both the unfolding of meaning in the world of space-time existence (*Dasein*) and the determinate existence of ideal objects, such as mathematical natures. The latter are not actual (*wirklich*) in the sense of existing and operating under space-time conditions. But they do enjoy an independent, subsistent meaning that is reducible neither to actual spatio-temporal existents nor to our thoughts, but only to the divine mind. God alone is fully actual and meaningful. In respect to the pure essences, his main function is to provide the ground of their unity and order. Nothing is said about the Thomistic notion of co-principles of being; act and potency, existence and essence, form and matter, are regarded as parts or layers in the constitution of finite being.

These points explain why it is unfortunate that Edith Stein did not probe deeper into Aquinas's historical situation and into the relation between metaphysics and theory of knowledge in Aquinas and Husserl. They also bring to uncomfortably sharp focus for Thomists the problem of encouraging the interest of phenomenologists and mathematical logicians in the nature of ideal objects and constructs, while at the same time incorporating this interest within a dominant theory of being as existent. A start might be made with an examination of the manner in which Stein handles (pp. 90-91) the well-known text of the *De Potentia* (III. 5 ad 2) on the relation between the quiddity and the divine creative essence.

This book is expertly edited. There are two shortcomings, however, that should be corrected in future editions. The editors (Dr. L. Gelber and Father Romaeus Leuven, O.C.D.) report that Edith Stein had prepared an extensive index of names and subjects for the first half of the book. They themselves have left the printed work without any

index, stating that the manuscript one was incomplete and that a complete index would considerably increase the book's cost. But the work is such a vast and important one that scholarship as well as piety toward the author's intention would seem to require that an adequate one be provided. The editors mention the possibility of issuing one separately at a later date. Although this is not an entirely satisfactory arrangement, it does have the precedent of Edith Stein's own practice, since she issued a separate (and quite exhaustive and illuminating) index to her translation of the *De Veritate*. It is to be hoped that the latter index will be included in volume three of the collected works.

The second editorial point concerns the editor's decision to leave out the two appendices written by the author for this book. The first contained excerpts from St. Teresa's *Castle of the Soul;* and the second contained excerpts from Martin Heidegger's writings, along with some critical comments. The exclusion of the first appendix is not too great a loss, since all of the relevant texts are found again, in more digestible form, in *The Science of the Cross*. In the case of the second appendix, however, the editors have deprived us of a valuable document. Their reasons for not including its complete text are that only Heidegger's books written before 1936 are considered and that the author would have wanted to make a thorough revision of her remarks in view of the radical development undergone by Heidegger since that date. As a sort of compromise, they scatter her estimate of Heidegger among a number of footnotes (cf. especially the notes to pp. 21, 52, 55 ff., 134, 141). This distribution does her comments an injustice, since they thereby lose their impact as a unified criticism. Furthermore, it would not be without interest to have collected in one place precisely those texts in the pre-1936 corpus of Heidegger which seemed worthy of transcription. Again, the unity of the impression is lost in the present arrangement. In her foreword, Edith Stein was careful to mention that Heidegger's approach to phenomenology had been made during her years as Husserl's assistant, that she had made his personal acquaintance at that time, that she had been strongly impressed by his *Sein und Zeit* (1927), and that *at that time* she had not been able to come to grips with his doctrine. That she should couple St. Teresa and Heidegger in special appendices and should give so detailed an account of her intellectual relations with the latter, are signs of the great importance she attached to a comparison between Heidegger's fundamental ontology and her own.

The footnotes about Heidegger, reunited, make a significant appraisal, one which the author might have wished to add to and revise,

but not completely transform or disintegrate. The fact that her comments were completed by 1936 makes them all the more valuable. For they interrogate Heidegger in such a way that they uncannily foreshadow the very problems he has been meditating upon in subsequent years. It is as though his latest phase were dictated by the need to answer the searching questions she asked of him, especially concerning the relation between human existence and the meaning of being, as well as the relation between the absolute and the nought (on this latter point, some revision would be necessary). Furthermore, the full significance of Edith Stein's aim in *Finite and Eternal Being* is left in shadow until one ferrets out from the Heidegger footnotes that there is need for bringing about an understanding between Heidegger and Aquinas, as well as between Husserl and Aquinas. For instance, she regards time, rather than the relation between essence and existence, as the distinguishing mark of finite being as such. This fits in not only with Husserl's stress on the unfolding and being unfolded of meanings but also with Heidegger's preoccupation with the temporal character of finite *Dasein*. But she opposes Heidegger's contention that time provides the gateway to a grasp of the sense of being, maintaining rather that only from the standpoint of being does time give up its secret. To investigate "finite and eternal being" is to issue a challenge to Heidegger to declare, for his own part, whether the finite must remain enclosed within itself or whether the meaning of being can only be fully grasped when finite being is traced to its roots in the eternal being. For these reasons it would be advisable in some future printing to restore at least the second appendix to its original form.

Since the literature on Edith Stein is still rather sparse, the following bibliographical remarks may be useful. Sister Teresia Renata de Spiritu Sancto, the prioress of the Carmel at Köln-Lindenthal, has written an informative biography entitled *Edith Stein: Lebensbild einer Philosophin und Karmelitin* (Nurenberg: Glock and Lutz, 1948). A brief sketch of her personality is made in the magazine *The Third Hour* (1950), by Dom Raphael Walzer. Dr. Rudolf Allers has made a translation of a study by Edith Stein on Dionysius: "Ways to Know God" (*Thomist,* IX [1946]). My own analysis of her articles in Husserl's *Jahrbuch* appeared shortly after her death: "Edith Stein and the Advance of Phenomenology" (*Thought,* XVII [1942]). We may expect that critical studies on her philosophy will multiply rapidly with the issuance of her collected works and the recognition of her high philosophical genius.

James Collins

Saint Louis University

MAN AND THE STATE. By Jacques Maritain. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1951. Pp. x + 219. $3.50.

In this volume, the great Christian philosopher offers an inquiry into some of the fundamental problems of social organization on whose solution the fate of mankind depends.

He begins by establishing a few basic concepts and insists on the necessity of distinguishing among the nation, the body politic, the state, and the people. A nation is an ethnic community which has become conscious of the fact that it has a common unconscious psyche. A body politic is a society, a work of reason (which the national community is not), a whole embracing the totality of communities and societies. The state is only a part of the body politic, the one especially concerned with the maintenance of law, the promotion of common welfare, and the administration of public affairs; it receives its authority from the body politic and is inferior to it. The people is a multitude of human persons united under just laws; they constitute a body politic striving for the common good. After these positive statements, there comes a set of negative ones culminating in the complete rejection of the concept — nay, the very word — of sovereignty; instead, to the body politic (not the state) is ascribed the right of full autonomy, internal and external; it is an inalienable right, but only in the meaning that nobody may forcibly deprive the body politic of it.

The end of the body politic is the achievement of common good. Thus, the problem of means is posed. Very realistically, the discussion is divided into two parts: first, the problem of means in democratic society; second, in a regressive or barbarous society. In a democracy the problem is solved when one recognizes that democracy is the only way of bringing about a moral rationalization of politics. Therefore true democracy can live only on gospel inspiration. "The more the body politic were imbued with Christian convictions, the more deeply it would adhere to the secular faith in the democratic charter." In nondemocratic societies the problem is most difficult; though the moral rules are immutable, their application takes lower and lower forms as the social environment declines. This problem, one must acknowledge, is not so well elaborated by the eminent author as the other ones are.

The next problem discussed by Maritain is that of the rights of man. Man is superior in value to the body politic, which is superior to the state. At this place the discussion shifts to the familiar topic of natural law. Only a few salient points can be mentioned. Natural law is declared to be coincident with the normality of functioning which is grounded on the very essence of man. Natural law requires that

whatever it leaves undetermined shall subsequently be determined (by positive law). Advocates of a liberal-individualistic, communistic, or personalistic type of society will lay down, at least on paper, similar lists of the rights of man.

But the rights of man receive their highest recognition in democracy. This leads the author to the discussion of the democratic charter. Again, only a few from among the many brilliant statements can be reported. The author shows very convincingly the right, even the duty, of a commonwealth of free men to defend itself with particular energy against those who refuse to accept the foundation of common life in such a regime. Maritain has highly inspiring things to say about the dynamic energy of political movements which occur inevitably and cannot be embodied in any institution. On that basis, "self-appointed prophets" arise. This is a quite vital and necessary social phenomenon, but also a dangerous one. The happiest state for the body politic obtains when the top men in the state are at the same time genuine prophets of the people.

Near the end of the book, Maritain discusses two more concrete but highly actual problems. One is the relationship between church and state. In his opinion, in our "historical climate," which is that of a secular age, the goal should be a new Christianly inspired civilization, grounded on the very unity of human nature, simultaneously a member of the body politic and of the church. In this way, real co-operation between the two could obtain; not only should the state guarantee the full freedom of the church, but it should also ask the assistance of the church for its own temporal common good.

The second problem is the problem of world government. The solution, for Maritain, is the formation, not of a supergovernment or a superstate, but of a supranational body politic. As a step toward this goal, a supranational advisory body should be formed, deprived of any power, but endowed with unquestionable moral authority; the members would tell the governments and the nations that which they held to be just.

The present reviewer, as a sociologist, has a few questions to ask Mr. Maritain, the social philosopher. Maritain's conception of the state seems to be too narrow. For him the state is almost identical with government, whereas, for a sociologist, the state is a complex social organization comprising all the people and characterized by specific functions (in brief, internal and external security) and an exceptionally developed central nucleus.

Second, that society which is above the state cannot be called properly "body politic," since its functions are by no means limited to politics

—if one does not use the term "political" in the Aristotelian meaning, which, in our day, would be misleading. The sociologists call it "all-inclusive society," "a civilization," and so on; perhaps the appropriate term would be "commonwealth."

Third, while the sociologist recognizes that he is not allowed to make value judgments—in the meaning of weighing the positive or negative value of something which is—the social philosopher seems not to recognize the necessity of a similar limitation upon judgments of reality. Take, for instance, Maritain's definition of the people as reported above. A people is had only if human persons are united under just laws. But what if they are united under unjust laws? Is there today, for instance, no Russian people since the Communist laws are unjust? And if not, then what are the Russians? It is true that for Maritain—and many other philosophers—an unjust law is not a law. What is, then, the centralized system of co-ordination of human conduct by means of politically enforced norms obtaining in Russia—and in numerous societies with unjust laws? And what about societies whose law is partly just and partly not? Should perhaps a general concept be introduced to designate the system of co-ordination just mentioned, a concept to be divided into law, technical rules enforced by a tyranny, and perhaps a few intermediary classes? The sociologist would, however, use the term "law" to designate all of them and would refer to the social philosopher the problem of finding an objective yardstick to measure the value of the individual classes; but for him, what the law is, is independent of the question whether it is right or wrong. Could not, on that basis, an agreement be found between sociologist and social philosopher to terminate irritating discrepancies in definitions and terminology?

Fourth, the contemporary sociologist would not agree with Maritain's rationalism expressed in the assertion (basic in the discussion of natural law) that man is (always) acting with an understanding of what he is doing.

Finally, at a few places Maritain's admirable work is spoiled by inconsistency. At one place, he suddenly ascribes to the people control over the state—while in his terminology it should be ascribed to the body politic. At another place, an undefined concept of "civil society" appears, complicating the already complex system of Maritain's distinctions. And at a third place, the body politic is explicitly identified with the people, despite previous painstaking efforts to distinguish between the two.

N. S. Timasheff

Fordham University

Dominations and Powers. Reflections on Liberty, Society and Government. By George Santayana. New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1951. Pp. ix + 481. $4.50.

Appearing between 1896 and 1951, the thirty volumes by Santayana form in some ways the greatest body of work yet done by an American philosopher. They are the greatest in extent; they are much more consistent than the work of Dewey, for example; they are the calmest, the most enriched by the history of Western man or even the history of man; and they show more of what Santayana somewhere calls breeding. They are on all subjects, too: poetry, beauty, religion, morals, reason and knowledge, essences, spirit and matter. This latest, and perhaps last, volume purports to be on liberty, society, and government.

It really does have ripe reflections on just these topics. But it is on everything. It is a body of notes which record soliloquies written down by the author over a period of more than thirty years: on the family, the child, the savage, on culture, religion, matter and spirit as conceived by Santayana, war, Catholicism and Protestantism, science, socialism. He used the words "dominations and powers" as a catch-all, and for years and years threw into one sheaf what he thought fell more or less under this dual heading. Finally he more or less sorted the notes and put them in some order in this book.

The result is a work that is full of acute observations on man, especially on the lone man, the individual man, on men in small groups, on man as loving power, on man as liking to bow down to somebody in power. The work does not look very profoundly into problems of liberty as these are now mainly conceived—the problems of our wider social freedoms in politics, economics, and religion—but more commonly into problems of individual, almost individualistic, independence. This is the liberty that Santayana has lived and known. He has never been close to wider struggles for liberty, but has been in general a sage aloof from society, a condition that limits his practical wisdom.

At the same time, it allows him to be largely an unimpassioned observer. He has a little trouble, however, expressing—and we may say defending—what he calls his materialism. He says he is a materialist-naturalist, and yet he defends spirit. The result is not easy to comprehend. For instance, when he says that the free movement of spirit is hindered by being lodged in one point of space and one point of time, we wonder if he is not, in spite of his claims, a dualist. So, too, when he says that by understanding the instability of life, the learned transcend it and can discount spiritually the bias of

their own age. At least some who believe in spirit in orthodox and unapologetic terms might conclude that Santayana believes in it just as they do. He labors to hold something different, but seems to revert.

Again, he is not really able in this book to prove that politics is merely a game demonstrating its own vanity or that government is essentially an army carrying on a campaign. The book is full of such suggestive and brilliant notions, some of which might not stand close scrutiny. In a few places it has platitudes which we think could have been written only by an old and tired or unwell Santayana.

He remains slightly tough toward Protestantism, which he considers was never built for a true humanism. He says religion's task is, or would be, to recognize the Powers on which our destiny depends, propitiate them, and live in harmony with them. But he thinks religion ought not be fierce, narrow, miserly, illiberal. On the contrary, he would have it a major liberating force, open to all the knowledge and love that man can produce or even conceive. He says it is wisdom not to ask all to be monks and celibates, to make a distinction between commandments and counsels, to show great tolerance towards weakness, both intellectual and moral. He says that for Catholics a fusion with Hellenism to form a rich human civilization is not, as it is for Protestants, an appendage, almost a treason, but a spontaneous, genial, and poetical way of being Christians. He says Catholics find no incongruity in the introduction of humanity into piety, nor does it occur to Don Quixote to balk at a chivalrous crusade.

This is a mature, quiet, and discontinuous work, almost any of whose one hundred and twenty-five chapters we could enjoy independently of the rest. It is Santayana all over again, on all the subjects in which he has ever been interested.

Leo R. Ward

University of Notre Dame

Existenzphilosophie und Panhumanismus. By Gerhard Kränzlin. Schlehdorf am Kochelsee, Obb.: Bronnen-Verlag, 1950. Pp. 250. DM 10.50.

The career of existentialism dates back to Kierkegaard's reaction against Hegel. Even among our contemporaries, the early works of Sartre and Marcel use a contrast against idealism to establish the originality of their own claims. A century ago, a book on existentialism and panhumanism might have found Kierkegaard present-

ing the credentials of concrete reality against the prevailing mode of systematic philosophy.

Kränzlin reverses these historical and doctrinal directions. He argues that, behind their front-line battle against idealism, the existentialists at heart are idealists. In the present work, he would oppose his own neo-Hegelian panhumanism to the current cult of existence. On all points where the existentialists are clear and consistent they are idealists, the argument runs; and where they are obscure, idealism can provide the necessary light.

What panhumanism is the author explains in a short concluding chapter; for further details the reader must consult Kränzlin's two other books, *Die Philosophie vom unendlichen Menschen* (1936) and *Das System des Panhumanismus* (1949). These works place the author in the shadow of Hegel.

The present book is polemical. Five of its six chapters supply critical sketches of the philosophies of Kierkegaard, Husserl, Scheler, Heidegger, and Jaspers. Husserl and Scheler are presented as windows to the understanding of Heidegger, but Kränzlin avails himself of the occasions to argue that they too were idealists. In general, the five historical chapters are faithful renditions of the philosophers in question; and since the case that these men were idealists is argued only in a kind of marginal way throughout these first five chapters, Kränzlin's idealism will not annoy a reader who wants a capsule version of the philosophers here treated. The omission of Sartre from a work of this sort is quite serious; great sections of *L'Etre et le Néant* and the entire thesis of *L'Imagination* would have brought serious difficulty to Kränzlin's interpretation of existentialism.

Yet even the five men here treated cannot be so easily captured by the forces of idealism. Like Sartre, Heidegger pretends to undercut the critical problem on the grounds that there is no *tertium quid* available to test whether things are real or not. The whole first volume of Jaspers' *Philosophie* is a convincing challenge to any kind of systematic idealism, whether called panhumanism or by any other name. From Kierkegaard onward, existentialists have been tortured by the so-called antinomies of experience that idealism is not qualified to resolve.

This book is rather surprising for the following reasons.

Idealism is not the answer to existentialism. Historically it has been the occasion for existence philosophies. Though there is much of Hegel that remained in Kierkegaard, as Jean Wahl has shown,

existentialism cannot be subdued by the very Hegelian philosophy which existentialism was designed to answer. The differences between the two viewpoints are too vast.

As Maritain has remarked, existentialism like that of Sartre and Heidegger marks a new low tide in the course of modern philosophy. It is difficult to foresee a new stage of the post-Cartesian spirit. Something different must now be tried if philosophy is to continue. Is this new stage of modern philosophy to be a return to idealism? This reviewer does not think so. The great direction of twentieth-century thought has been away from idealism and toward the concrete—*zurück zur Sachen.* Except for a few hangers-on, idealism is now for all practical purposes decadent and dead. It has lead to the three typical philosophies of the present—American pragmatism, European existentialism, and Russian Communism. It cannot answer any of them.

Though the author is opposed to empiricism as a good idealist would have to be, it is strange to find him arguing in the last chapter that empiriological physics supports his panhumanism. Relativity physics and quantum mechanics have, we are told, de-substantialized matter and left us a world of mere relation. While Einstein's epistemology does lay heavy stress on the free creativity of the mind and while Margenau has given an idealistic color to quantum mechanics, yet idealism as such would seem to invalidate the empiricism so deeply embedded in the empiriological method. Idealism offers no account of the stubborn opposition of fact, the "cut-and-try" character of every experimental arrangement, the reason why we need experimental test as well as theory.

Finally, the allusions to Scholastic thought as a bed-fellow of the idealists are not very historical. The ontology of the Scholastics, St. Thomas included, is alleged to be dependent on an epistemology. Kränzlin would have it that both the theory of being and the theory of knowledge in the Middle Ages were determined by the solution to the problem of the universals. This is not historically accurate. The very definition of knowledge as a *fieri aliud in quantum aliud* is derived from an ontological metaphysics.

Vincent Edward Smith

University of Notre Dame

The New Physics. By Sir C. V. Raman. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1951. Pp. 144. $3.75.

Originally delivered as a series of radio talks, *The New Physics* is primarily intended for the layman. Its author, Sir Chandrasekhara

Venkata Raman, is the distinguished physicist who was awarded the Nobel prize in physics (1930) for the discovery of the effect which bears his name.

The author remarks, right at the beginning of chapter 1: "An Irishman, if there be one amongst my listeners tonight, might feel inclined to ask me the question, how old is this New Physics about which you are talking to us?" Now I suppose that we Irish cannot escape the charge that we are always asking awkward questions (and usually we have good reasons for so doing); but I feel I can assure Sir Chandrasekhara that no decent Irishman would have any but nice questions to ask about the charming and interesting book in which he ranges over so wide a field of both pure and applied science.

This diversity of subject matter is unified by reason of the outlook of its author, an outlook which might be roughly described as a scientific humanism. This humanism, which is not explicitly related either to a proreligious or an antireligious standpoint, finds expression in lucid prose. Unencumbered, happily, by any of those snippets of mathematical symbolism which so often turn popular accounts of science into deceptive instruments of general education, *The New Physics* leaves the reader with the sound impression that modern physics is a science of nature, of a nature no other than that which he has known from his earliest childhood. And if, as one suspects, it was the author's intention to inspire the younger members of his original audience with a love for the wonders of nature and a respect for the difficult labors of a science related to human needs, one cannot think that he failed. The second chapter of the book, which deals with the cosmic rays, displays, in the space of four pages, Sir Chandrasekhara's power to combine general statements about the nature of physical research with clear descriptions of actual methods of research into the nature of a determined effect and to relate all this to the practical life of men.

Throughout the book, one comes across statements and judgments which one would like to see developed. Many of these have an interest for the philosopher, particularly for the philosopher of nature. Among these, the following appear to be particularly interesting. (*a*) With reference to the successes of modern physics: "What has been the secret of all these amazing successes? Simply stated, it is the elimination of the Newtonian mechanical laws from the field of atomic and molecular physics and their substitution by other and new laws governing sub-atomic processes" (p. 5). (*b*) With reference to the biological purpose of form and structure in the plant and in the animal: "We can safely generalize and say that nearly every detail of geometrical

form has some purpose to serve in the functioning of life'' (p. 24). (*c*) ''It is *astonishing but very satisfactory* that the 32 different crystal classes and the 230 different types of internal grouping of particles indicated to be possible by pure geometrical reasoning are precisely the numbers respectively of crystal classes and of atomic groupings which have been found by experimental study to exist'' (p. 28, italics mine). (*d*) ''The menace which soil erosion presents to the continuance of successful agriculture is an alarming one in many parts of India, calling urgently for attention and preventive action. . . . It is obvious that the aim should be to check the flow of water at the earliest possible stage before it has acquired an appreciable momentum and correspondingly large destructive power'' (p. 63). (*e*) ''Water is the basis of all life'' (*ibid.*). (*f*) ''The esential unity of all the sciences finds a striking illustration in the fact that our knowledge of crystals is derived from the labours of investigators in many different fields of study'' (p. 91). (*g*) With reference to interpretations of the red shift of the lines in nebular spectra: ''I must refrain from expressing any opinion of my own on these highly debatable questions'' (p. 127). (*h*) ''All the trends of the present time indicate that biology is getting closer and closer to the basic science of matter. If we cannot hope to see in the next ten years the mystery of life completely solved, we may at least expect a fuller understanding of its physical and chemical basis'' (p. 134). (*i*) ''The commentators who like to consider discoveries as accidents forget that the most important part of a scientific discovery is the recognition of its true nature by the observer, and this is scarcely possible if he does not possess the requisite capacity or knowledge of the subject'' (p. 138).

Finally, I hope it may not appear out of place to ask an Irishman's question. On page 9 it is written: ''The purpose of scientific study and research is to obtain an ever deeper understanding of the working of nature,'' a subordinate result of which will be an addition, through the efforts of the applied scientist, to ''the world's wealth and welfare.'' But, on the other hand, it is written on page 141: ''Science . . . is a fusion of man's aesthetic and intellectual functions devoted to the representation of nature. It is therefore the highest form of creative art.'' How is science to be understood to be at once an understanding and an art?

True, there is a side of physical science which is an art. But that is not the point. Ought we be aware here of an influence of Indian intellectual traditions on our author's thought? Should we say of the scientist, in Indian terms, *satya-saṅkalpa*—he is the one whose conceptions are true and therefore efficacious? But, then, we are naming

an attribute which is applied properly to Brahman-âtman considered as lord of souls and of the world. Just how radical is our author's humanism? And does *The New Physics* spring from a philosophy of science which is properly Indian, and not occidental, in its inspiration?

BRIAN COFFEY

Saint Louis University

THE DEVELOPMENT OF LOGICAL EMPIRICISM. By Joergen Joergensen. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1951. Pp. iv + 100. $1.25.

This book is Number 9 of Volume II of the *International Encyclopaedia of Unified Science.* It deals with the development of empiricism from the beginning of the century until 1940, thus forming a sequel to Number 8 of the same publication, in which Edgar Zilsel traced the broad history of empiricism prior to the twentieth century.

The present volume is a typical example of Professor Joergensen's work, thorough, detailed, comprehensive. The first section of the volume treats of the evolution of the Vienna Circle. The second section accounts for the expansion of the movement which originated in the discussions of Moritz Schlick and his friends. As a reference work, for students wishing to familiarize themselves rapidly with the ramifications of logical-empiricist thought, this work is just what is needed. Without fuss, it introduces the student to names, books, doctrines, propagandist enterprises, and future intentions, following the chronological order. No philosophical library should be without several copies. The low price is an added attraction.

BRIAN COFFEY

Saint Louis University

A NEW THEORY OF GRAVITATION. By Jakob Mandelker. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1951. Pp. 25. $2.75.

The basic idea which Dr. Mandelker puts forward is the following: Taking it for granted that the fundamental property of *all* forces encountered in nature is their bipolar manifestation, and then remarking that "one exception, or one apparent exception (p.1)" seems to exist in gravitation, he seeks, on the ground of an electric or magnetic analogy, a force of repulsion correlative to gravitational attraction; and he suggests that "the outwardly directed radiational force of matter-energy is coordinated as the counterforce to the inwardly directed force of gravitation" (p. 2). In other words, he seeks to connect the mass m and the gravitational constant k as the expression of the gravitational attraction directed toward the center of this mass

with the concentrated potential energy mc^2 of the same piece of matter, an energy waiting only for its release to radiate out. "It would be very intriguing," he remarks, "to connect both seemingly different aspects—the *energical* potential and the *gravitational*—of the same entity, which is matter" (*ibid.*).

Applying the assumption that gravitation forms the bond which prevents radiation to the expression E - mc^2, he seeks a verification of his conjecture through the demonstration of the existence of an equilibrium between radiational and gravitational forces. And, discarding the conception of the constancy of c, where gravitational fields are present, (see A. Einstein, *Relativity* [1947], p. 89), and taking m also as a variable, he manages to derive a numerical value for a retarding factor required for states of statical equilibrium in which no radiation takes place. Now this numerical value of the retarding factor turns out to be the same as the numerical value of the gravitational constant. This result enables him to develop his investigation within the atomic realm. "Since radiation manifests itself as an atomic disintegration process, and since, according to the above results, gravitation is related to it, it appears quite logical to treat the whole problem only in connection with proton mass, the smallest unit of undivided matter" (p. 9).

Among the interesting developments which Dr. Mandelker explores is *the formulation of a natural system of units.* Dr. Mandelker's work is of more interest to physicists than philosophers, however.

I doubt whether it is altogether wise to seek symmetry in nature at all costs. The physical world is, after all, just what it is. What entities are there, are there; and no question of multiplying or demultiplying them can arise for an attentive intelligence. Symmetry is not, in fact, the most subtle form of order, as Japanese gardeners have realized very well. On the other hand, the unveiling of the relationships which may be developed from the symbolic structures with which modern physics attempts to understand the physical world is a valid enterprise and may further considerably the peculiarly oblique understanding which modern physics affords of things. But a symmetry within the range of equations—and that is something which is largely an achievement of mathematical constructivity—does not necessarily correspond to a symmetry in nature. And from this standpoint radiational phenomena do not appear as the obvious counterparts of gravitational phenomena. Nevertheless, we shall hear much more, in the future, of energy mechanics.

Brian Coffey

Saint Louis University

THE FOUNDATIONS OF ARITHMETIC. By Gottlob Frege. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1950. Pp. xii + xii + XI +XI + 119 +119. $4.75.

This volume includes the German text of Frege's *Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik* (*Inhalt*, pp. i-xii; *Einleitung*, pp. I-XI, and the text proper, pp. 1-119). There is an English translation of the German text facing the German text, the pages of the translation being numbered to correspond with the pagination of the original. The translation has been well done by Mr. J. L. Austin of Magdalen College, Oxford.

The *Grundlagen* dates from 1884, and was followed, in 1893, by volume one and in 1903 by volume two of the *Grundgesetze der Arithmetik*. Both works have long been unobtainable, though sections of the *Grundgesetze* appeared in translation in the *Monist*, 1915 and 1916. Yet the *problem* of the definition of number is better studied in Frege than in Russell. The publishers have done a great service to students of mathematical philosophy in making this important work available again.

BRIAN COFFEY

Saint Louis University

METHODS OF ENQUIRY. By C. West Churchman and Russell L. Ackhoff. Saint Louis: Educational Publs. Pp. 558. $6.00.

This volume is a textbook on scientific method. It is a good teaching instrument because the authors have presented the views, as regards scientific method, of a number of philosophical schools, including the most modern, thus introducing the reader to that actual diversity of opinion which is a real indication of the existence of a tough, unsolved problem. In the hands of an erudite and wise teacher the book should therefore produce the important effect of stimulating the thought of students. But something more than mere stimulation is also needed, if the studies of university students are to be fruitful. In spite of, or perhaps because of, the modern pragmatic standpoint of the authors, the book concludes with a question: "Can we even now develop a scientific way of deciding whether we are to follow a speculative, positivistic, pragmatic, or some other as yet not formulated analysis of scientific method?" (p. 549).

Now it is true that the state of many people today is quite properly expressed by some such question. One would hope that the wise teacher would have an answer and that he might be able to lead students to see this answer as necessarily true, thus enabling his students

to reach, in their intelligences, the stability of a scientific conviction. While I have no doubt that a number of people believe that they can in fact enable students to realize the desirable state of certainty in relation to all burning questions, I rather doubt, in view of the dearth of good books about the special problems of method in the field of the modern sciences as considered from the standpoint of a moderate realist epistemology, whether the certainty referred to is realized at the level at which the special questions arise. It may be, in fact, that much of what passes for study of the scientific method is mere confusion and unwarranted assumption. But it is certainly true that much of what is written about scientific method is written by thoughtful and truth-loving men who seek knowledge in the situation in which they find themselves, that is, within the confusions of the modern intellectual scene. I have seen no recent work in the field of logical and methodological study comparable to the great volume of Joseph's. And I doubt whether we shall have done what we should do for our students until we can attain a comparable scholarship. I am sure the people who are confused will not be satisfied with generalities derived from a metaphysics, even from a genuine Thomistic metaphysics. The difficulties which our modern empiricists and pragmatists raise have to be faced at the level at which these difficulties present themselves.

For example, the authors of *Methods of Enquiry* present the usual story about the development of non-Euclidean geometry, and they permit the usual conclusions to be drawn from the story. Now, in fact, the precise reasons which led Euclid to formulate what is now thought of as the blemish of the fifth postulate are not known. It appears likely, though, that Euclid determined to use the fifth postulate in order to resolve certain difficulties connected with the very object of geometry (Euclidean geometry) which had preoccupied men long before his time. (Heath provides all the necessary documentation). Anyone who has meditated the procedures of Saccheri knows very well that apart from the questions concerning the validity of certain assumptions which lead to the construction of the logically consistent non-Euclidean geometries, there arises also a question concerning the nature of the Euclidean object. The problem of the foundation of a Euclidean geometry has been by-passed in the discussion about the non-Euclidean geometries; and certain sweeping conclusions about the structure of deductive theories are now accepted by almost everybody just because the real difficulties of Euclidean geometry (those concerning its foundation) have been quite neglected both within the Thomistic school and without. And it may be noted that a solution to such difficulties is not to be found by recourse to methods

of intuition. If I hold a post card up before a class, with the idea of leading my students to say that the card is rectangular, that rectangularity is to be seen in the card, my idea is a deluded one. The notion of rectangularity involves the notion of measurement, and were a post card a perfect rectangle, there is no means available by which I could truly say that the card was a rectangle, that rectangularity was to be seen in it. There is not one of us that knows, or could ever know, in present circumstances, whether the card in question is or is not a rectangle. The reason for this state of affairs is simple. The angles of the card can be known to be equal and right only if we have ascertained by a process of measurement that they are equal and right. But this lies beyond the capacity of men and of their instruments. We have therefore to seek elsewhere for the foundation of our notion of rectangularity. In a Euclidean geometry we should have to construct the rectangle. But just try to construct a rectangle, in a Euclidean plane geometry, without vicious circle in your reasoning and without the use of the parallel postulate or some theorem dependent upon it, and you will find yourself in just the difficulties which Euclid surmounted by formulating the fifth postulate. Why did he have to do so, to retain the geometry discovered in Greece? There is the big question that our moderns do not know how to ask. What is the answer? That lies in the mystery of the second degree of abstraction, which, all objections to the contrary, Thomists will continue to consider an essential item of Thomistic philosophy. The experience of the modern mathematical logicians can teach us here what should never have been forgotten, that the essential theses of philosophy are all difficult to grasp and to hold in scientific certainty. That our authors end with a question is the merit of a book which, in my opinion —and even though it requires correction on many points—could well be used in colleges by senior students who wished to understand the *situation* in modern methodology.

Brian Coffey

Saint Louis University

Connaissance du temps. By Ernest Huant. Paris: Lethielleux, 1950. Pp. 150.

In this work the treatment of time is almost exclusively positivistic. Metaphysical studies of time are of set purpose disregarded inasmuch as their arguments can have only "une valeur uniquement spéculative plus au moins contestable . . . et en tout cas dépourvus du tout caractère effectif" (p. 21). For his "point de départ" the author deems it essential to take "les données nouvelles que la Physique

moderne apport sur le concept du temps . . . si déroutantes qu'en puissent paraître les conséquences pour les notions habituelles de notre esprit'' (p. 8).

The argument proceeds from an exposé and analysis of time, as employed in the physics of relativity and quantum mechanics, to the conclusion that time is intimately connected with—physically founded on, or even produced by—action, in the technical sense of discontinuous change in energy condition. The fields of biology and psychology are then extensively examined for confirmation of this conclusion and for verifications of the various properties of time already deduced in the foregoing analysis. Finally a synthesis is attempted of physical time and psychological time. The author is to be commended for his practical protest against a practice that is all too general—the artificial dividing of knowledge into unrelated compartments.

From a philosophical standpoint the present work can scarcely be termed a success. The data analysed, ''les données nouvelles que la Physique moderne apport,'' do not contain in themselves the answer to the question, What is time? We may agree or disagree with Aristotle's analysis and with the definition of time at which he thereby arrived; but if we wish to reach a real definition at all we can do so only by a method more or less like his—the analysis of our judgments regarding time to discover what is the reality implicitly affirmed in those judgments.

Physical science, insofar as it is immediately concerned only with measuring—with discovering pointer-readings—and with establishing the functional relations that obtain among these measure-numbers, does not even attempt to discover what the nature is of that which is measured. Once the numbers have been obtained by actual measurement, the subsequent mathematical operations prescind entirely from the source whence these numbers have been derived; if any restriction is introduced it is because of knowledge that is not mathematical. But *before* we can measure intelligently we must have at least a confused knowledge of what it is that we are to measure; for instance, we must know what time is and what length is with a clarity at least sufficient to distinguish between the two—otherwise we might just as well use the clock to measure the length of the trajectory and the metre-stick to measure the time taken by a ball to roll over this trajectory. Direct measurement consists essentially in determining a ratio, the ratio of the quantity to be measured to an arbitrarily selected unit of the *same type* of quantity. The measure so obtained is a concrete number, for instance, two seconds or two feet. The abstract number ''two'' is one

and the same whether we have two feet or two seconds; but two feet are quite different from two seconds. We know this, and we know it only because we have at least a confused knowledge of what length is and what time is. To discover what time is, is nothing more or less than to clarify and make explicit what is implied in this confused knowledge. This question will never be answered by multiplying measurements, for each measurement repeats the question in the same way; nor will it be answered by analyzing mathematical functions which prescind from the nature of what is numbered. To discover "how much," is to acquire real and valuable knowledge; but as long as we restrict our investigation exclusively to considerations of "how much," we can never hope to discover "what."

The radical defect of the present book is its complete neglect of the real distinction between "what" and "how much," or, equivalently, of the distinction between a real definition and an operational definition. A quotation will illustrate what I mean. It is from this confusion, and not from the "données nouvelles que la Physique moderne apport," that the "conséquences déroutantes" take their rise.

> Ainsi, quand nous raisonnions sur notre horologe radioactive en parlant de l'état d'un atome à l'instant t, nous faisions encore une supposition gratuite sur la possibilité que présentait la nature réelle de se laisser définir à un instant déterminé: Il n'y a pas d'instant—ou il est impossible de définir l'instant. *Le concept du temps à l'échelle quantique s'évanouit pour une double raison: impossibilité de définir l'instant, inexistence d'une possibilité d'échelle cohérente de temps.* . . . Cette double raison n'étant, sans doute, que la réponse unique de la nature réelle qui répond invariablement à nos investigations les plus poussées, qu'elle ne veut pas connaître que les phénomènes, et qu'elle ignore tout du cadre tempore-spatial habituel dans lequel nous voulons les enfermer (pp. 53-54).

Thomas A. O'Keefe, S.J.

Jesuit Seminary, Toronto

Mélanges Joseph Maréchal. 2 vols.; Bruxelles: Museum Lessianum, l'Edition Universelle; Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1950. Vol. I, pp. 380; Vol. II, pp. 426. Paper, two vols., 425 fr. belges.

This collection of essays was first intended in honor of Maréchal's fiftieth year in the religious life (1943); but because of his repugnance, the project was abandoned and then revived in 1948, four years after his death. The collection is divided into two volumes. Volume

one contains a bibliography and biography of Maréchal, reprints of several important articles by Maréchal that are difficult to secure, and some of his unpublished writings. Volume two includes a variety of essays by men well qualified in philosophy, psychology, and the history of philosophy.

Along with Maréchal's preoccupation with rational and experimental psychology, biology and the sciences, and mysticism, his interest in metaphysics and knowledge is evidenced by his memorable *Le Point de départ de la métaphysique*. The essays in volume one are, in large, extracts from this latter work, and the emphasis is on elaborating and understanding the metaphysical doctrine of knowledge. In explaining the knowledge process, Maréchal appeals to intellectual intuition and the intellectual dynamism in objective knowledge. When considering the internal dynamism of the acts of knowing, Maréchal proposes two critiques to insure the objectivity of knowledge—a metaphysical critique of the object which presupposes that knowledge immediately grasps the object as it is in itself; and a transcendental critique where the object is defined not from the viewpoint of external causes, but from the point of view of the a priori conditions which make, or give rise to, that object as object. Maréchal is at his best in his analysis of Kant's position and his criticism of Kant's transcendental critique. As Professor Gilson has remarked in his *Réalisme thomiste et critique de la connaissance*, no realist, with the exception of Maréchal, has ever asked the Kantian problem in the Kantian sense; Maréchal did the best that could be done on that point, and did so magnificently.

The essays in philosophy found in the first part of volume two are primarily involved with metaphysics and knowledge; and Maréchal's analysis of Thomistic critique is favored by the Jesuit contributors, especially of the Louvain school. Some essays that might be mentioned in this section, which are excerpts from the writers' better known works, include the following: Aimé Forest on the signification of objectivity; N. Balthasar on abstraction and "transcendentalisation"; André Marc, S.J., on demonstration, truth, certitude, and testimony; Auguste Grégoire, S.J., on science and metaphysics; Franz Grégoire on the notion of the infinite; Pierre Lachièze-Rey on the unicity of the universe; and Joseph de Finance, S.J., on finality in being and the meaning of the universe.

The second part of volume two is devoted to psychology and contains three contributions: A. Gemelli, O.F.M., on psychology in the face of psychiatry; Juan Z. Bengoechea on the degrees in the vivacity of knowing, which is a comparison of Maréchal's sentiment of presence and his

doctrine of mysticism; and J. Donceel, S.J., on the psychology of the will.

The history of philosophy, part three of volume two, is treated by some outstanding scholars in this field. E. Brehier writes on the Neoplatonic "celestial mechanism"; and R. Arnou, S.J., on the nature of intelligence in Plotinus. G. Théry, O.P., contributes a study of medieval translations; and M. Grabmann contributes *De Anima*, an unedited treatise of the thirteenth century. D. Lottin, O.S.B., writes on the natural law in St. Thomas, and E. Gilson on the nature and scope of Scotus's proofs for the existence of God.

This two-volume work is monumental in scope, both from the standpoint of philosophical doctrine and scholarly achievement. Maréchal might well be praised not only by his own work, but also by the work of his many followers and friends who have honored him in so deserving a way.

Lottie H. Kendzierski

Marquette University

La Philosophie anglaise classique. By Emmanuel Leroux and André Leroy. Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1951. Pp. 216. Paper, 200 fr.

This history presents classical English philosophy as "a philosophy of reason actively engaged in the problems of human existence" (p. 214). Whether dealing with the intellectual, moral, social, or religious life, English philosophers are shown to be, not system-builders, but men with a taste for the concrete, for the lived experience, for the most immediate reality, which is often, for them, the experience of the life of the mind. Prefaced by a chapter on medieval philosophy and the first English thinkers, the book continues with discussions of Francis Bacon, Hobbes, the Cambridge Platonists, Locke, Berkeley, ethical theorists such as Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, Hume, political economists, the associationists and intuitionists, and John Stuart Mill. The first six chapters were written by M. Leroux; after his death the work was completed by M. Leroy.

The book gives a balanced and clear exposition of the main discussions in the principal works of each author studied. For the major thinkers it includes more aspects of thought than one usually finds in an introductory history; and it does not ignore, in an attempt at simplification, the complexity present in each man's thought. Few critical comments are given, but those that are made—chiefly by M. Leroux—point mainly to incompleteness within the context of a philosopher's views. A philosopher, he shows, sometimes fails

to deal adequately with the problems he sets for himself. Francis Bacon, for example, poses but does not solve the problem of induction, and Thomas Hobbes erects an elaborate political doctrine on incomplete truths.

The approach in the handling of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume is somewhat different here from the usual presentation in a general history. Instead of treating these men as three successive chapters of one continued story, the authors wish to stress instead the originality of each one. The treatment of Berkeley is of particular interest. Leroux not only summarizes the *Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision,* the *Dialogues,* and *Principles of Human Knowledge,* but also discusses the contents of the *Commonplace Book* and that strange work, *Siris.* This study leads him to conclude that we miss the true Berkeley if we view him only through our knowledge of David Hume. Although the critical and negative aspect of Berkeley's philosophy had a great influence on Hume, Hume is in fact, he believes, only a "half-disciple" of Berkeley. The true center of Berkeley's perspective is, Leroux thinks, his spiritualism, and therefore his true heirs are rather to be found in a Maine de Biran, a Ravaisson, or a Bergson.

The latter part of the book refers briefly to the lack of concern with metaphysics in the preoccupation of English thinkers with human problems. The implications of this point might well have been more fully developed. The reader will wish, too, that an index of proper names had been appended to this book; in a history of thought discussing many minor philosophers not mentioned in the table of contents, such an index is certainly needed.

Beatrice H. Zedler

Marquette University

La Destinée humaine devant la science. By Albert Bessières, S.J. Paris: Editions Spes, 1951. Pp. 140. Paper, 225 fr.

Despite its title, this book is not a systematic study of the end of man in the light of the findings of science. It is rather the story of three French scientists who found their way back to the Catholic faith, which each had left early in life at the first encounter with the idol of science. Alexis Carrel, Lecomte du Nouy, and Charles Nicolle all ultimately learned through study, suffering, and prayer that their work as scientists was compatible with devotion to God. The relation of science and religion is thus the central problem of the book, but the author avoids any abstract discussion of the issue.

Believing that men are more easily reached by facts than by theses, he presents factual narratives, comments by friends and relatives of the person discussed, and summaries of, and excerpts from, such works as Carrel's *Man the Unknown,* Lecomte du Nouy's *Human Destiny* (*L'Homme et sa destinée*), and Nicolle's *Human Destiny* (*La Destinée humaine*). In a brief but critical and cautious treatment, the author reveals both the lights and the shadows in the writings of these men, who were relearning the meaning of life and death. He shows in particular how each was handicapped by his lack of philosophical and theological knowledge.

Parts II and III of the work form an epilogue to the main discussion. Part II seeks to give a partial explanation for the scientists' loss of faith; that is, the influence of such "blind guides" as Taine, Berthelot, and Renan. Part III mentions briefly some scientists who, had they been chosen as masters, could have served as competent guides and symbols of the union of science and faith; for example, Volta, Ampère, and Pasteur.

As a work of piety, this book does not pretend to solve any of the problems of the relations of science and philosophy, but it does give an interesting account of the spiritual journey of three modern scientists.

Beatrice H. Zedler

Marquette University

Essays on Logic and Language. Edited by Anthony Flew. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1951. Pp. vii + 206. $3.75.

In his lucid and engaging introduction (pp. 1-10), A. G. N. Flew explains that the twin objectives of this anthology are (*a*) to supply a handy depository of dated [1931-49] but representative essays by British philosophers and (*b*) to acquaint the general literate public with the purport and importance of the thriving school of linguistic analysts, inaugurated by Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* and perpetuated by the impressive labors of—among others—Gilbert Ryle, Bertrand Russell, and G. E. Moore.

By "systematically misleading expressions" (pp. 11-36) in a natural language, Gilbert Ryle understands all instances of "an expression misleading in virtue of a formal property which it does or might share with other expressions" (p. 19). There are numerous expressions whose grammatical similarity successfully masks irreducible logical differences. Three principal types are distinguished here, all liable to mislead in the direction of a bloated ontology by multiplying entities

needlessly: (*a*) *quasi-ontological* expressions, such as "carnivorous cows do not exist"; (*b*) *quasi-Platonic,* such as "unpunctuality is reprehensible"; and (*c*) *quasi-descriptive,* such as "the top of the tree." And in each type "an expression is misconstrued as a denoting expression which in fact does not denote, but only looks grammatically like expressions which are used to denote" (p. 32). Systematically misleading expressions, therefore, disguise rather than disclose the contours and forms of the facts they presumably purport to record. And it is incumbent upon the responsible philosopher to employ only such expressions as by virtue of their grammatical shape exhibit, in a way which others fail to exhibit, "the logical form of the state of affairs or fact that is being recorded" (p. 33).

Professor J. N. Findlay soberly observes in "Time: A Treatment of Some Puzzles" (pp. 37-54) that "there are some questions which beset us, not because there is anything genuinely problematic in our experience, but because the ways in which we speak of that experience are lacking in harmony or are otherwise unsatisfactory" (p. 39). With monumental patience and microscopically detailed analysis, Findlay reviews the problematic of time discourse as depicted by St. Augustine, Zeno, Whitehead, and McTaggart, and attempts to pierce "the web of words with which we overlay our world" (p. 40). One result of this technique is to re-establish on independent grounds Whitehead's insight that, contrary to much current opinion on the topic (as Ross's *Aristotle*), it is "foolish to imagine that we can meet Zeno's puzzles by the modern theory of the continuum or by the facts of convergent numerical series" (p. 49). The general thrust is that so far forth as the classic conundrums of time are verbal problems, conscientious linguistic analysis dispels pseudophilosophical puzzles by supplying their verbal solutions or, better, dissolutions.

Confronting directly the classic issues, formulated in Bertrand Russell's chapter on induction in his *Problems of Philosophy,* Paul Edwards in "Bertrand Russell's Doubts about Induction" (pp. 55-79) reformulates the central questions thus:

> (1) Assuming that we possess *n* positive instances of a phenomenon, observed in extensively varied circumstances, and that we have not observed a single negative instance (where *n* is a large number), have we any *reason* to suppose that the n + 1st instance will also be positive?
>
> (2) Is there any number *n* of observed positive instances of a phenomenon which affords *evidence* that the n + 1st instance will also be positive (p. 55)?

Bertrand Russell answered no and presumably still does. Edwards

answers yes. And it is Mr. Edwards's specific point that Russell commits the fallacy of *ignoratio elenchi-by-redefinition-in-process-of-analysis.* For Russell transforms "reason," as conventionally employed in *1,* to read "*logically conclusive* reason"; and "evidence," as construed in *2,* to mean "*deductively conclusive* evidence" in subsequent analysis.

It is, however, Mr. Edwards's contrary contention (*a*) that without invoking any nonempirical principle for validation we often have a *reason,* as conventionally employed in *1,* for supposing that a generalization will be confirmed in the future as it has been in the past; and (*b*) that numbers of "cases of a law being fulfilled in the past" do often afford *evidence,* as construed in *2,* that it will be fulfilled in the future. The complete argument reads:

> A period which has to the past and present the relation of happening after it will resemble the past and the present in certain respects because in the past periods which stood in the same temporal relation to other periods were found to resemble those periods in these respects (p. 69).

It is at least dubious whether this maneuver improves the strategic position. But Mr. Edwards is prepared for rebuttal. For when all is said and done, if obstinate inquirers persist in their desire to know how inductive procedures can succeed, let them realize that nothing can succeed like success. *Voilà!* They do succeed.

With a touch of whimsy, Margaret Macdonald purports to show in "The Philosopher's Use of Analogy" (pp. 80-100) that "philosophical propositions are not factual but verbal" (p. 80) and notes that "curious practice of using words by analogy without giving the analogy any intelligible application" (p. 82). In particular, "it is not clear in what sense problems about being are more than problems about the uses of the categories" (p. 88). For "what the philosopher does is to notice certain differences in our use of ordinary words which seem to require explanation by a theory about that to which the words are said to refer" (p. 95). And hence "the investigation of physical changes is a different undertaking from the investigation of philosophical puzzles which arise from the language used to describe such changes" (p. 96). For it is a fact that "'what we say' in certain circumstances is explicitly appealed to in the arguments of most philosophers although they often go on to try to deduce what must be the case from what we say" (p. 99). Those who are disposed to interpret the metaphysical enterprise far otherwise must be prepared to show cause for their position. I predict that many such realists will be seriously exercised in

resolving the traps of language which the authoress sets for them. It goes without saying that vigorous affirmation and vehement reiteration are inadequate defenses in this impasse.

In "Is There a Problem about Sense-Data?" (pp. 110-16) G. A. Paul is concerned to

> deny that in order to give a complete and accurate account of any perceptual situation it is necessary to use a noun in the way 'sense-datum' is used, for this leads to the notion that there are entities of a curious sort over and above physical objects which can 'have' sensible properties but cannot 'appear to have' sensible properties which they have not got (p. 109).

Mr. Paul's discussion is altogether problematic, exploratory, interrogative, not definitive. He is appearently unaware of the act-potency analysis of sensation. It would be illuminating to test this analysis by application to the pertinent problems here raised and pondered.

In "Verifiability" (pp. 117-44) Dr. Friedrich Waismann re-presents what remains intact after excision from the original paper of its pointed polemical sections. The total effect somewhat resembles one portion of a transcribed telephone conversation. It makes good sense, but important nuances and orientations are presumably missed or guessed, never guaranteed. But an alert and enlightened reader can restore as much of the whole as is necessary or useful.

Because of "the 'open texture' of most of our empirical concepts" (p. 119) and "the essential incompleteness of an empirical description" (p. 121), it eventuates that

> the incompleteness of our verifications is rooted in the incompleteness of the definition of the terms involved, and the incompleteness of the definition is rooted in the incompleteness of the empirical description; that is one of the grounds why a material object statement p can *not* be verified conclusively nor be resolved into statements $s_1, s_2 \ldots s_n$ which describe evidences for it (p. 123).

Hence "the programme of phenomenalism falls flat" (p. 121). Although therefore "there is a very close relation between content and verification" (p. 129), one cannot identify the meaning of a statement with the evidences we have for it. Among other interesting and provocative points, raised in the second and more seriously truncated portion of the paper, one may note the following. (*a*) If English expressed color, as it does luster, by verbs in place of adjectives—for instance, as stars "twinkle" and jewels "glitter," so the sky "blues"—what appreciable difference, if any, would this convention make to philosophical analysis and metaphysical categories? (*b*) If the way we see a fact (that is, what we emphasize and what

we disregard—for presumably we do not see everything it contains) is *our* work, what relevance, if any, has this datum to the conventional doctrine of abstraction? (*c*) What does one make of the statement that "language, then, contributes to the formation and participates in the constitution of a fact; which, of course, does not mean that it produces the fact" (p. 141)? Concede it? Deny it? Distinguish it? (*d*) If all analysis discloses that "a scientific theory is never a slavish imitation of certain features of reality, a dead, passive replica; it is essentially a *construction* which to a more or less degree reflects our own activity" (p. 142), then what epistemological formulas are on hand to interpret this fact? Is *species expressa* adequate? And if not, may it be expanded or revised to include this circumstance? Or what alternative have you?

The main purpose of H. L. A. Hart in "The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights" (pp. 145-66) is

> to suggest that the philosophical analysis of the concept of a human action has been inadequate and confusing, at least in part, because sentences of the form 'He did it' have been traditionally regarded as primarily descriptive whereas their principal function is what I venture to call *ascriptive*, being quite literally to ascribe responsibility for actions much as the principal function of sentences of the form 'This is his' is to ascribe rights in property (p. 145).

This advocate's approach discloses

> how wrong it would be to succumb to the temptation, offered by modern [verificational] theories of meaning to identify the meaning of a legal concept, say 'contract', with the statement of the conditions in which contracts are held to exist; since, owing to the defeasible character of the concept, such a statement, though it would express the necessary and sometimes sufficient conditions of the application of 'contract', could not express conditions which were always sufficient (p. 154).

A minor issue, perhaps, for those habituated to other and restricted areas of the realm of significant meaning, but neatly posed and pertinent in a crucial manner to all simplicist and reductionist theories of meaning.

Margaret Macdonald reappears in an encore performance to present in "The Language of Political Theory" (pp. 167-86) her whimsical perplexities concerning the curious notation in which texts of political philosophy are written:

> One meets here a 'contract' which one is carefully warned was never contracted; an 'organism' unknown to biology; a superior 'person' or higher 'self' with whom

> one can never converse; an 'association' or 'corporation', whose objects are obscure and which is not listed in any of the recognized directories (p. 167).

Hence "one trouble in politics is to determine how far the questions are empirical and to what extent they are linguistic" (p. 168).

After a painstaking autopsy of the contract view, the organic view, and the utilitarian or realist view in their historical contexts of proposal, the conclusion is reached that

> the value of the political theorists . . . is not in the general information they give about the basis of political obligation, but in their skill in emphasizing at a critical moment [in history] a criterion which is tending to be overlooked or denied (p. 186).

And this result is considered significant because "the fundamental puzzle of political philosophy . . . is to find a valid reason for political obligation" (p. 177).

John Wisdom's "Gods" (pp. 187-206) is neither blasphemous nor reverent, neither superstitious nor scientific, neither psychic nor neurotic, neither fish, nor flesh, nor fowl. Whatever it be, it is indubitably flabby. This may be merely a stylistic mannerism beyond the reviewer's comprehension. Or perhaps a fatal malady. In any case, the essay molds a mood, like an impressionist canvas. And moods have their place. But it fails to be a coherent statement of a defined position or attitude or pose. There is no reason to doubt that it means what it says. But it is difficult, if not impossible, to say what it means, if anything. I seriously feel that Fraser's *Golden Bough* has put Wisdom in the middle of a muddle that Freud only complicates and even linguistic analysis fails to dissolve.

But, all in all, this is an unusually rich and provocative anthology. Those who are familiar with its problems will want the volume to complete a personal library of representative (some classic) pieces. Those who are ignorant of the issues that are discussed herein, but aware of their importance, will find the book an indispensable and enlightening primer. Those who are both uninformed and uninterested thereby forfeit their title as philosophers in the contemporary context. Most readers will side with Gilbert Ryle and "rather allot to philosophy a sublimer task than the detection of the sources in linguistic idioms of recurrent misconstructions and absurd theories. But that it is at least this I cannot feel any serious doubt" (p. 36).

Joseph T. Clark, S.J.

Woodstock College

THE IMPACT OF SCIENCE ON SOCIETY. By Bertrand Russell. "Matchette Foundation Lectures," No. III. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1951. Pp. vii + 64. $2.00.

To those who know whereof they speak, the philosophical stature of Bertrand Russell is immense and indisputable. But these lectures are trivial, if entertaining. The brochure is another warning, if such were needed, how easily foundation lectures degenerate into an empty ritual of university devotion.

Lecture 1, "Science and Tradition" (pp. 3-20), purports to recount "the purely intellectual effects of science as a solvent of unfounded traditional beliefs, such as witchcraft" (p. 4). It is seriously remarked how seventeenth-century science (*a*) supplanted authority by observation, (*b*) espoused the autonomy of the physical universe, (c) dethroned the concept and cult of purpose, and (*d*) altered man's place in the universe. The treatment is pathetically unhistorical, and hence infected with the fallacy of *post hoc ergo propter hoc*. It paradoxically eventuates that the impact of science (particularly of the history of science) on Bertrand Russell has not yet been forceful enough to dislodge him from the comfortable lap of some unfounded legends, for instance the one about Vesalius. One would have preferred to see Russell aligned against the perpetuation of *all* old wives' tales.

Lecture 2, "Effects of Scientific Technique" (pp. 21-43), dealing especially with the time since the Industrial Revolution, records with superficial analysis (*a*) the impact of physics and chemistry in terms of gunpowder, the mariner's compass, the steam engine, textile machinery, transportation acceleration, electricity and its uses in communication, oil, internal combustion engines, aviation, and atomic energy; and (*b*), with less information and more prognosis, the impact of biology, physiology, and psychology on public health, eugenics, and mass behavior phenomena. In general, the lecture repeats much cant and countless *clichés*. Entertaining, perhaps, but unenlightening.

Lecture 3, "Science and Values" (pp. 44-64), depicts "the influence of the new techniques on government, on social classes, on the old problem of the limits of individual liberty, and on the possibility of deliberate biological modification of the human species" (p. 44). And Russell warns that "the philosophy which is being suggested by the triumphs of science [pragmatism] . . . if unchecked, may inspire a form of unwisdom from which disastrous consequences may result" (*ibid.*). The older and more respectable Russell reappears in a 1907 quotation to the effect that "the pragmatic theory of truth is inherently connected with the appeal to force" (p. 49).

This profound insight is unique and solitary in these barren pages.

Russell's ignorance of the Christian theology of human society is appalling. This betrays him into an animus that condemns itself. For we are told that if a faith (the allusion is transparent) involves a priesthood, "it gives great power to a caste professionally devoted to maintenance of the intellectual status quo and to a pretense of certainty where in fact there is no certainty" (p. 56). But this is indeed to bark in the dark at a mythological bogey-man. And not *all* of the representative ecclesiastics to whom one can point as contrary instances can be "exceptions." Russell might do well to survey a representative cross section of contemporary ecclesiastical professional journals.

Grounding his precarious case on the notoriously sloppy logic of loose analogies, Russell here concludes that "it is therefore irrational to suppose that much would be gained if, in the defeat of Communism, Catholicism were enthroned in its place" (p. 57). But this conclusion is as cogent as its parallel that "reasons of symmetry make it irrational to suppose that much would be gained if, in place of one frustrated foot, the other were inserted in the same shoe."

World conditions are indeed ominously critical at the moment. But there is presumably hope. For

> the root of the matter . . . is love, Christian love, or compassion. If you feel this, you have a motive for existence, a guide in action, a reason for courage, an imperative necessity for intellectual honesty. If you feel this, you have all that anybody should need in the way of religion. Although you may not find happiness, you will never know the deep despair of those whose life is aimless and void of purpose; for there is always something that you can do to diminish the awful sum of human misery (p. 60).

But is this more than vacuous sentiment? Surely this cannot be, in sum, the genuine impact of science on society. If "old soldiers never die," what happens to aging philosophers?

JOSEPH T. CLARK, S.J.

Woodstock College

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF CURRENT PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS PUBLISHED IN NORTH AMERICA

For the purposes of this bibliography, "philosophy" will be understood in a very broad sense. It will include works in other fields—such as sociology, aesthetics, and politics—that involve philosophical principles and problems.

"Current" books will be understood to include new books, revised editions, and reprints if the previous printing had been out of stock for a notable period of time, or if there is a notable difference in price, format and the like.

The procedure is as follows:

1. *Books announced for publication will be listed in the issue which next appears after the announcement is received.*
2. *Books actually published will be listed in the subsequent issue, even though they were already listed in accordance with No. 1 above.*
3. *Books received by* THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN *will be listed with full bibliographical information and a descriptive and/or critical note in the subsequent issue, even though they were already listed in accordance with No. 1 and/or No. 2. This will be done even if a full review is to appear later.*

ALDRIDGE, ALFRED OWEN. *Shaftesbury and the Deist Manifesto.* Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1951. Pp. 89. Paper, $1.50.

Aristotle's De Anima *with the Commentary of St. Thomas Aquinas.* Tr. by Kenelm Foster and Sylvester Humphries. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1951. $6.50.

AUGUSTINE, ST. *Confessions.* "Collector's Eds."; New York: Pocket Books; Sept., 1951. $1.00.

———. *Letters.* Vol. I (1-82). Tr. from the Latin by Sister Wilfred Parsons. Vol. XII of *Fathers of the Church;* Vol. IX of *The Writings of St. Augustine.* New York: Fathers of the Church. Pp. 442. $5.00.

BACON, FRANCIS. *Essays of Francis Bacon.* New York: Heritage Press; Oct., 1951. $4.65.

BAKER, HERSCHEL. *The Decline of Man: Studies in the Decay of Christian Humanism.* Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1951. $6.00.

BALZ, ALBERT G. A. *Cartesian Studies.* New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1951. Pp. vi + 328. $4.50.

———. *Descartes and the Modern Mind.* 2 vols.; New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1951. $15.00.

BARROW, R. H. *Introduction to St. Augustine.* Tr. from the Latin. New York: Macmillan Co., 1951. Pp. 288. $6.00.

BAUMGARDT, DAVID. *Bentham and the Ethics of Today.* Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press; Dec., 1951. $7.50.

BAYM, MAX I. *The French Education of Henry Adams.* New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1951. Pp. xiv + 358. $5.00.

BENDIX, REINHARD. *Social Science and the Distrust of Reason.* Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1951. Pp. 42. Paper, 50¢

BERTOCCI, PETER A. *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion.* New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc.; Oct., 1951. $6.35.

BETHELL, S. L. *The Cultural Revolution of the Seventeenth Century.* New York: Roy Publs., 1951. $3.50.

Bhagavad-Gita, The Song of God. Tr. by Swami Prabhavananda and Christopher Isherwood. Introduction by Aldous Huxley. New York: Harper & Bros., 1951. $2.00.

BLACKHAM, H. J. *Six Existentialist Thinkers.* New York: Macmillan Co.; Nov., 1951. $2.00.

BOURKE, VERNON J. *Ethics, a Textbook in Moral Philosophy.* New York: Macmillan Co., 1951. Pp. xii + 497. $4.25.

This textbook is arranged for a college course of two semesters, though it is adaptable to other presentations. The material of the book has been used in preliminary form for several years, and the results of classroom experience have been incorporated into the present text.

The author uses the ethical theories of St. Thomas Aquinas, but arranges them in an order suitable for classroom use and applies them to present-day concrete realities. His thorough acquaintance with St. Thomas and his mastery of moral reasoning on the basis of an informed judgment about moral facts are evident throughout.

Each chapter contains a summary, some selected readings, and a bibliography of further readings. There is also a general bibliography and a detailed index. [*To be reviewed*]

BUCHLER, JUSTUS. *Toward a General Theory of Human Judgment.* New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1951. $2.75.

BURLEIGH, WALTER. *De Puritate Artis Logicae.* Ed. by Philotheus Boehner, O.F.M. "Franciscan Institute Publications"; St. Bonaventure, N. Y.: Franciscan Institute, 1951. Pp. xv + 115. Paper, $1.50.

According to the editor, the *De Puritate Artis Logicae* exists in two partial versions, designated CPA and LPA. Only one manuscript of LPA is known, and it is this which has been edited, with modernized spelling, completion of obvious lacunae, and so forth. The tract is incomplete, containing only two sections of three; these in turn constitute only one part of a projected work in four parts. The sections here presented are "De regulis generalibus consequentiarum" and "De natura syncategorematum."

The editor points out in his introduction that this is an early fourteenth-century work of realist logic. He also sets forth a hypothesis about the relation between CPA and LPA, suggesting that both are unfinished works—CPA being an earlier version, LPA a projected elaboration. He thinks that CPA begins with *suppositio,* because that is the point at which realist and nominalist logics are directly in conflict.

The editor and publisher are to be congratulated on their success in getting out valuable text editions under difficult circumstances. Scholars will gladly use these texts, though the proofreading of the introduction to this book could have been done with greater care; the printing also is unpleasantly uneven.

BUTCHER, S. H. *Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art.* New York: Dover Pubns., 1951. $4.50.

CARY-ELWES, COLUMBA, O.S.B. *Law, Liberty and Love: A Study in Christian Obedience.* Introd. by Arnold Toynbee. New York: Devin-Adair Co., 1951. $4.00.

CASSIRER, ERNEST. *Philosophy of the Enlightenment.* Tr. by Fritz C. A. Koelln and James P. Pettegrove. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press; Dec., 1951. $6.00.

CHUDOBA, BOHDAN. *The Meaning of Civilization.* New York: P. J. Kenedy & Sons; Nov., 1951. $4.00.

Communist Problem in America, The. A Book of Readings. Ed. by Edward E. Palmer. New York: Crowell, 1951. Pp. xvi + 496. $2.50.

These readings—selected from books, magazines, and newspapers—illustrate the basic formulations of Communist strategy and tactics, the development and the nature of the American Communist party, the relationships between some American institutions and the Communist program, and the legal solutions that have been attempted. Some of these documents contain expositions or criticisms of dialectical materialism; others touch on general problems of interest—for example, those which concern the question of academic freedom. The book is useful as a convenient source of contemporary documentation for class work and discussion, as well as for the reader who may have missed some of the articles in their first appearance.

An appendix contains the list of organizations and publications which have been declared to be Communist or Communist-front by the Committee on un-American Activities of the United States House of Representatives.

There is an index.

CONANT, JAMES BRYANT. *On Understanding Science.* New York: New American Lib.; Dec., 1951.

CONZE, EDWARD. *Buddhism: Its Essence and Development.* New York: Philosophical Lib.; Nov., 1951. $6.00.

DAVITT, THOMAS E., S.J. *The Nature of Law.* Saint Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1951. Pp. v + 274. $4.00.

This is a historical study of the nature of law, showing how the practical problem of obligation is related to the philosophy of intellect and will. The author considers two different philosophies of intellect and will and shows how they each issue in different concepts of law and have further consequences in the realm of practical action. The first group of philosophers asserts the primacy of the will, either absolutely or with some qualifications; the author has selected as representatives Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus, Ockham, Biel, de Castro, and Francis Suarez. The second group of philosophers comprises St. Albert the Great, St. Thomas Aquinas, Cajetan, Soto, Medina, and St. Robert Bellarmine. The study is carried on by way of a careful analysis of the statements of the philosophers themselves.

The documentation is ample and carefully selected. There is an excellent bibliography; the index is very detailed. [*To be reviewed*]

DESCARTES, RENÉ. *Discourse on Method, Meditations on the First Philosophy, and Principles of Philosophy.* Tr. by John Veitch. New American ed. of "Everyman's Library"; New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1951. Pp. 317. $1.45.

DODDS, E. R. *The Greeks and the Irrational.* Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1951. $5.00.

DUNN, WILLIAM P. *Sir Thomas Browne.* Revised ed.; Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press. $3.00.

EMERSON, RALPH WALDO. *Works.* New York: Tudor Pub. Co., 1951. Pp. 1170. $3.98.

EWING, A. C. *Fundamental Questions of Philosophy.* New York: Macmillan Co.; Oct., 1951. $3.50.

FEIBLEMAN, JAMES K. *Ontology.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press; Nov., 1951. $9.50.

FISCHER, HANNS. *Karl Jaspers Trilogy.* New York: Russell F. Moore Co.; Dec., 1951. $2.75.

FLESCH, R. *Art of Clear Thinking.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1951. $2.75.

FREYTAG, BARON BRUNO VON. *Philosophical Problems of Mathematics.* New York: Philosophical Lib.; Sept., 1951. $2.75.

GOOD, FREDERICK L., and KELLY, OTIS F. *Marriage, Morals, and Medical Ethics.* Introd. by Most Rev. Richard J. Cushing. New York: P. J. Kenedy & Sons; Nov., 1951. $3.50.

GREGORY, WILLIAM K. *Evolution Emerging.* New York: Macmillan Co. Vol. I, Pp. 736; Vol. II, Pp. 1013. $20.00.

HASTINGS, JAMES. *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics.* New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons; Oct., 1951. $85.00.

HAZARD, JOHN N. *Soviet Legal Philosophy.* Tr. by Hugh W. Babb. "20th Century Legal Philosophy Series," No. 5; Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press; Dec., 1951. $7.50.

HEGEL, G. W. F. *Science of Logic.* "Muirhead Library of Philosophy Series"; New York: Macmillan Co.; Sept., 1951. 2 vols. $6.00.

HILDEBRAND, DIETRICH VON. *The Nature of Good and Evil.* New York: David McKay Co.; Jan., 1952. $5.00.

HOFFMAN, ROSS J. S. *The Spirit of Politics and the Future of Freedom.* Milwaukee: Bruce, 1951. Pp. xi + 98. $2.50.

This is the first "Gabriel Richard Lecture." This lectureship has been established by the National Catholic Education Association in honor of Father Gabriel Richard, to present Catholic thought on the important issues of the day in a scholarly form. The first lecture was given at the University of Detroit, appropriately enough, since that was the scene of Father Richard's labors.

The author, beginning with the present-day concern for freedom, asks whether we as Americans can reasonably hope for the salvation and even the spread of freedom. He takes the American and French revolutions as case histories, trying to find out why one of them endured in its bestowal of freedom and the other did not. He finds that social institutions and forms alone are no guarantee; rather, they must be combined with a spirit that will keep them alive and functioning. This spirit he discovers to be a realization of the dignity of man's nature and of the help of Divine Providence in carrying out his socio-political obligations.

HUGH OF SAINT VICTOR. *On the Sacraments of the Christian Faith (De Sacramentis).* Tr. from the Latin by Roy J. Deferrari. Cambridge: Mediaeval Acad. of America, 1951. Pp. xx + 486. $5.00.

This translation is based on an as yet unpublished critical text prepared by Brother Charles H. Buttimer, F.S.C.; for this reason it is impossible to check the accuracy of the translation. The translator has identified all scripture references and the longer quotations from the church fathers which occur particularly in the second book; other quotations and oblique references are not identified. Nowhere is it mentioned that *sacramentum* in Hugh of St. Victor has a wider meaning than the English ecclesiastical term "sacrament."

There is a brief bibliography and an index. The publishers are to be thanked for making this valuable work available in such a fine edition.

HUSSERL, EDMUND. *Ideas.* "Muirhead Library of Philosophy Series"; New York: Macmillan Co.; Sept., 1951. $3.50.

INGE, W. R., and OTHERS. *Radhakrishnan: Comparative Studies in Philosophy Presented in Honour of His Sixtieth Birthday.* New York: Harper & Bros.; Oct., 1951. $5.00.

JASPERS, KARL. *Way to Wisdom.* New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1951. $3.00.

JOACHIM, H. H. *Aristotle: The Nicomachean Ethics.* Ed. by D. A. Rees. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1951. Pp. vi + 304. $5.00.

The manuscript of this commentary was discovered at the time of the author's death in 1938. The editor has arranged the matter somewhat and translated most of the Greek words occurring in the text; his additions to the notes have been indicated by brackets.

There is an introductory chapter of eighteen pages, which could serve as a general introduction to the thought of Aristotle. Though the rest of the work is in the form of a rigid commentary, several of the comments are full-scale discussions of important points of Aristotelian philosophy. Both a Greek index and an index of subjects are provided. [*To be reviewed*]

JOLIVET, RÉGIS. *Introduction to Kierkegaard.* Tr. by W. H. Barber. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1951. $4.00.

JORDAN, RUDOLF. *The New Perspective.* Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press; Nov., 1951. Pp. 320. $5.00.

JOUVENEL, BERTRAND DE. *Ethics of Redistribution.* New York: Cambridge Univ. Press; Oct., 1951. $2.25.

KANT, IMMANUEL. *Critique of Judgment.* Tr. by J. H. Bernard. "Hafner Lib. of Classics"; New York: Hafner Pub. Co., 1951. $3.50; paper, $1.75.

KUEHNELT-LEDDIHN, ERIK VON. *Liberty Versus Equality.* Caldwell, Idaho: Caxton Printers; Dec., 1951. $6.00.

LAMONT, CORLISS. *The Independent Mind.* New York: Horizon Press, 1951. Pp. 190. $2.75.

LANGER, SUSANNE K. *Philosophy in a New Key: A Study in the Symbolism of Reason, Rite and Art.* Reissue; Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press; Sept., 1951. $4.75.

LA PIERA, GIORGIO. *Philosophy of Communism.* Fordham Univ. Press Pub.; New York: Declan X. McMullen Co.; Oct., 1951. $4.00.

LOSSKY, NIKOLAY ONUFRIEVICH. *History of Russian Philosophy.* New York: International Univ. Press, 1951. Pp. 416. $10.00.

LUCRETIUS. *Nature of the Universe.* Tr. by R. E. Latham. "Penguin Classic"; New York: Penguin Books, 1951. 65¢

LUNN, ARNOLD HENRY MOORE. *The Revolt against Reason.* New York: Sheed & Ward. Pp. 287. $3.25.

LUXEMBURG, ROSA. *The Accumulation of Capital.* Tr. from the German by Agnes Schwarzchild; introd. by Joan Robinson. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1951. Pp. 475. $5.00.

MACHIAVELLI, NICCOLO. *The Prince.* New York: New American Lib., 1951.

MALONEY, CORNELIUS L. *Logical Positivism and American Education.* Washington: Catholic Univ. of America. Pp. 21. 50¢

MARCEL, GABRIEL. *The Mystery of Being.* Tr. from the French by René Hague. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1951. Pp. 196. $3.75.

MARITAIN, JACQUES. *Philosophy of Nature.* Tr. by Imelda C. Byrne, with an essay, "Maritain's Philosophy of the Sciences," by Yves R. Simon, and a bibliography by Donald A. Gallagher. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1951. Pp. x + 198. $3.00.

This study of the nature of the philosophy of nature and its relation to the natural sciences has been considered a classic in its field

since its appearance in 1935. All English-speaking philosophers will be grateful for this translation, as well as for the inclusion of Professor Simon's essay and Professor Gallagher's bibliography. There is an index of proper names, but no index of subjects. [*To be reviewed*]

MATHIS, LELAND. *Notes on the Theory of Progress.* Riverside, Ill.: Pine Ave. Publisher, 1951. Pp. 63. Paper, $1.00.

These notes are a series of loosely connected reflections about reality, progress, value, individual and society, religion, the future. The philosophy is a kind of pantheistic theory of world progress, strongly dependent upon science, but not inimical to humanistic culture values.

MAURIAC, FRANÇOIS. *Men I Hold Great.* Tr. by Elsie Pell. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1951. Pp. 130. $3.00.

This book might be classified as a group of essays in philosophical literary criticism. Of particular interest to philosophers might be the short chapters on Pascal, Voltaire, Rousseau, and Chateaubriand. The most interesting section from a philosophical point of view, as well as the longest, is that on Rousseau; he is treated with sympathy and at the same time with an intuitively keen criticism. There is an index.

MAYER, FREDERICK. *Essentialism.* New York: Russell F. Moore Co., 1951. $2.75.

METZER, JOHN HENRY. *Functional Logic.* Dubuque: Wm. C. Brown Co., 1951. Pp. vii + 110. $3.75.

MONTAGU, ASHLEY. *On Being Intelligent.* New York: Henry Schuman, 1951. $2.95.

MOORE, R. F. *Outlines of Jain Philosophy.* New York: Russell F. Moore Co.; Dec., 1951. $4.50.

MOORE, THOMAS VERNER, O.S.B. *Nature and Treatment of Mental Disorders.* 2d. ed.; New York: Grune & Stratton, 1951. Pp. 362. $5.50.

MUIRHEAD, J. H. *Contemporary British Philosophy.* "Muirhead Library of Philosophy Series"; New York: Macmillan Co.; Sept., 1951. $4.75.

MUMFORD, LEWIS. *The Conduct of Life.* New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1951. Pp. 351. $5.00.

NATHANSON, JEROME. *John Dewey.* New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons. Pp. 136. $2.00.

NIEMEYER, SISTER MARY FREDERICUS. *The One and the Many in the Social Order According to Saint Thomas Aquinas.* Washington: Catholic Univ. of America. Pp. 134. Paper, $1.50.

OCKHAM, WILLIAM. *Summa Logicae, Pars I.* Ed. by Philotheus Boehner, O.F.M. "Franciscan Institute Publications"; St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute, 1951. Pp. 200. $2.00.

OSGNIACH, AUGUSTINE J., O.S.B. *Must it be Communism?* With three chapters comprising Part Four by Jerome L. Toner, O.S.B. New York: Wagner, 1950. Pp. ix + 486.

The first part of this book discusses the nature and history of social problems. The second part, which is also the longest, discusses non-Christian solutions, especially liberalism, communism, and anarchism. In this part, the author presents the theories, traces their development, and gives a philosophical evaluation of their arguments and of the morality of their solutions. In the third part, the author gives the Christian solution, making use of the papal pronouncements, the bishops' program, and similar documents. Part Four, written by the Reverend Jerome L. Toner, O.S.B., deals with the more technical questions of the living wage, the closed shop, and some economic ob-

stacles to social action. There is a selective bibliography of suggested readings for each chapter; a detailed index is provided.

PARSONS, TALCOTT, and SHILS, EDWARD A. *Toward a General Theory of Action.* Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press; Nov., 1951. $7.50.

PAYNE, ROBERT. *The Fathers of the Western Church.* New York: Viking Press, 1951. $5.00.

PIEPER, JOSEPH. *Leisure the Basis of Culture.* Preface by T. S. Eliot. New York: Pantheon Books; Nov., 1951. $2.75.

PLATO. *Gorgias.* Tr. by W. C. Helmbold. "Little Library of Liberal Arts"; New York: Liberal Arts Press; Dec., 1951. $1.60; paper 60¢

———. *Phaedrus.* Tr. and ed. by R. Hackforth. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press; Dec., 1951. $3.25.

———. *Symposium.* Tr. by W. Hamilton. "Penguin Classic"; New York: Penguin Books; Jan., 1952. 50¢

POLANYI, MICHAEL. *The Logic of Liberty.* Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1951. Pp. viii + 206. $4.00.

This series of essays deals with various aspects of freedom. The author maintains that meaningful freedom presupposes certain absolute grounds. He shows this to be true by an analysis of the state and progress of modern science, as well as from other instances. [*To be reviewed*]

POUND, ROSCOE. *Justice according to Law.* New Haven: Yale Univ. Press; Nov., 1951. $2.50.

PRENTICE, ROBERT P., O.F.M. *The Psychology of Love According to St. Bonaventure.* "Franciscan Institute Publication"; St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute, 1951. Pp. xvi + 136. Paper, $2.00.

This proposes to be a study of what St. Bonaventure has to say about the nature of love as a natural activity of man. The author recognizes that St. Bonaventure has no explicit, fully developed statement on this subject and that even the order of treatment of scattered, oblique references may involve some subjective interpretation rather than a straightforward presentation. But in regard to these points he justifies his procedure quite well.

Another point of procedure lies in this, that the author tries to make explicit what St. Bonaventure left implicit. As it turns out, he uses Max Scheler and Karl Jaspers, among others, in his development. This is done to such an extent that the book might have been more appropriately called "the psychology of love, with special reference to the theory of St. Bonaventure." As can be seen, the study lacks internal unity of purpose.

There is no bibliography, and only an index of proper names. The printing is of poor quality.

QUINE, WILLARD. *Mathematical Logic.* Revised ed.; Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1951. $4.00.

RUNES, DAGOBERT D. *Spinoza Dictionary.* New York: Philosophical Lib.; Nov., 1951. $5.00.

SCHILPP, PAUL ARTHUR. *The Philosophy of Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan.* "Library of Living Philosophers Series"; New York: Tudor Pub. Co.; Nov., 1951. $7.50.

SCHRÖDINGER, ERWIN. *Science and Humanism: Physics in Our Time.* New York: Cambridge Univ. Press; Oct., 1951. $1.75.

SCOTT, ANDREW M. *The Anatomy of Communism.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1951. $3.00.

SIMPSON, GEORGE GAYLORD. *The Meaning of Evolution.* Revised and abridged; New York: New American Lib.; Oct., 1951.

SMALLEY, BERYL. *The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages.* New York: Philosophical Lib.; Dec., 1951. $7.50.

SMITH, GERARD, S.J. *Natural Theology—Metaphysics II.* New York: Macmillan Co., 1951. Pp. xvi + 297. $3.50.

This is the second volume in the "Christian Wisdom Series" of philosophy texts. The first part of this book concerns the proof of the existence of God. After discussing the nature and conditions of such a proof, and the need and possibility of it, the author takes up the proofs in detail. The second part, on the names of God, begins with a discussion of how we can name God at all, next takes up the "first name of God, He Who is," and then goes on to the divine attributes. After this come discussions of God's knowledge, will, creation, and providence.

Each chapter concludes with a selected bibliography of suggested readings; there is also a general bibliography at the end. The table of contents is detailed enough to serve at the same time as an analytic index; there is also an alphabetical index. [*To be reviewed*]

St. Thomas Aquinas on Aristotle's "Love and Friendship." Commentary on Aristotle's Ethics, *Books VIII-IX.* Tr. by Pierre Conway, O.P. Providence: Providence College Press, 1951. Pp. xvi + 132. Paper $1.50; cloth, $2.50.

TAYLOR, ALFRED EDWARD. *Socrates.* Boston: Beacon Press, 1951. Pp. 192. $2.50.

THOMAS, E. J. *History of Buddhist Thought.* New York: Barnes & Noble, 1951. $6.50.

THOMAS, MARY EDITH. *Medieval Skepticism and Chaucer.* New York: William-Frederick Press, 1950. Pp. 184. $3.00.

This book studies the thirteenth century, the crusades, skeptical tendencies among the learned, the fourteenth century, and Chaucer. The author tells us that she has used the works of G. G. Coulton; it is apparent that in many ways she also tends to follow his method. In brief, the author carefully selects the sources that affirm or demonstrate the presence of skeptical tendencies; full historical credence is given to the most gossipy chronicles and rhetorical exhortations. Though the book is for these reasons extremely one-sided, it can serve as a corrective for over-enthusiastic accounts of the "ages of faith."

A bibliography and an index are supplied.

THOMPSON, R. MOTSON. *Nietzsche and Christian Ethics.* New York: Philosophical Lib.; Dec., 1951. $2.75.

URBAN, W. M. *Language and Reality.* "Muirhead Library of Philosophy Series"; New York: Macmillan Co.; Sept., 1951. $4.75.

VIER, PETER C., O.F.M. *Evidence and Its Function According to John Duns Scotus.* "Franciscan Institute Publications"; St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute, 1950. Pp. xi + 173. $2.00.

WALZ, ANGELUS. *Saint Thomas Aquinas.* Tr. from the Latin by Sebastian Bullough. Westminister, Md.: Newman Press. Pp. 265. $3.50.

WATTS, ALAN WILSON. *The Wisdom of Insecurity.* New York: Pantheon Books, 1951. Pp. 152. $2.75.

WHITELEY, C. H. *An Introduction to Metaphysics.* Boston: Beacon Press, 1951. Pp. 186. $2.50.

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